Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

State of Utah v. Danny Lee Johnson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Francis M. Palacios; Lisa J. Remal; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johnson, No. 870096.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1615

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ypRSMECOURl

i u'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

•floO°l^
Respondent,

. -, :• MO. —

—

V.

Case No. 870096
DANNY LEE JOHNSON,
Category No. 2
Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Attempted
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, with an Enhancement for use of
a Firearm and Being An Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding.
FRANCES M. PALACIOS
LISA J. REMAL
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
v.
DANNY LEE JOHNSON,
Appellant.

Case No. 870096
Category No. 2
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Attempted
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, with an Enhancement for use of
a Firearm and Being An Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding.
FRANCES M. PALACIOS
LISA J. REMAL
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
DAVID WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . .

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

xi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

xii

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

xiv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

.....

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

8
POINT I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
FIRST DEGREE MURDER
A. THE EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CAUSE
TROOPER BRINGHURST'S DEATH IS
INSUFFICIENT

B.

POINT II.

POINT III.

1.

EVIDENCE OF INTENT IS
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE. . . ,

2.

MR. JOHNSON'S LEVEL OF
INTOXICATION NEGATES THE
FINDING OF A SPECIFIC INTENT
TO KILL TROOPER BRINGHURST. . .

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT
FINDS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
INTENT, SUCH EVIDENCE CAN ONLY
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
MANSLAUGHTER

8

19

22

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
MR. JOHNSON'S MISDEMEANOR THEFT
CONVICTIONS

26

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE BLOODY CLOTHING OF TROOPER
BRINGHURST BECAUSE THE PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT OF SUCH EVIDENCE SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED THE PROBATIVE VALUE.
..

30

ii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
PAGE
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM.

37

A.

THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT RELEVANT.

37

B.

THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM
WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN
PROBATIVE AND WORKED MORE TOWARD
IMPEACHING MR. JOHNSON'S CHARACTER
RATHER THAN ASSISTING THE TRIER
OF FACT
,

40

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
JEAN HICKHAM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

43

C.

POINT V.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL AFTER OFFICER OLSEN TESTIFIED
THAT HE WAS GUARDING MR. JOHNSON TO
STOP ANY ESCAPE ATTEMPTS
,

44

POINT VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
LIEUTENANT DAN FALLOWS A HOSTILE WITNESS OR
WITNESS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ADVERSE
48
PARTY

POINT VII.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF OFFICER
BRINGHURST'S REPUTATION FOR
TRUTHFULNESS

53

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
AFTER JURORS BEGAN DELIBERATIONS
DURING TRIAL

58

POINT VIII

A.

B.

THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED
MR. JOHNSON'S RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. . . . ,

58

THE EARLY DELIBERATIONS VIOLATED
MR. JOHNSON'S RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER
THE STATE CONSTITUTION.
. ..

63

iii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
PAGE
POINT IX,

POINT X.

POINT XI.

POINT XII.

POINT XIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN IT
BECAME NECESSARY FOR HER TO TESTIFY.
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
WARRANTS REVERSAL OF MR. JOHNSON'S
CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER. . .

64

69

THE CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE
CANNOT BE USED AS THE TRIGGERING
OFFENSE FOR THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL
CHARGE SINCE THE STATUTE SPECIFICALLY
EXCLUDES HOMICIDES

72

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
DOCUMENTATION OF MR. JOHNSON'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS WHERE THE STATE OF FAILED
TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PLEAS WERE
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY

74

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON
MR. JOHNSON'S CONVICTIONS FOR VEHICLE
BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO
PROVE THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE. .

80
85

CONCLUSION

iv.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES CITED
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979)

75, 76, 78, 79

Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingels & Associates, 653 P.2d 88
(Colo. App. 1982)

49

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258,
19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967)

76

Commonwealth v. Clark, 502 N.E.2d 564 (Mass. App. 1987) . . .

57

Commonwealth v. Sheline, 461 N.E.2d 1197 (Mass. 1984) . . . .

54

Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1981). . . . 49, 51
Ellis v. Ellis, 612 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)

54

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)

47

Fajeriak v. State, 439 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1968)

.

Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 240 (Okl. Crim. App. 1980)
Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278
(3d Cir. 1976)
Haney v. Mizzell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467
(11th Cir. 1984)
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253,
49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)

49
70
42
49
78

Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981)

28

Jennings v. State, 506 P.2d 931 (Okl. Crim. App. 1973). . . .

33

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166,
22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)

76, 77

Oxendine v. State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958) . . .

36

People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976)

47

People v. Taylor, 317 P.2d 167 (Cal. App.2d 1957) reh'g denied,
November 27, 1957, Hearing denied December 30, 1957. . . . 81, 83
v.

PAGE
CASES CONTINUED
Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001,
77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)

74

State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932 (Me. 1980)

54

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985)

84

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)

27

State v. Beers, 448 p.2d 104 (Ariz. App. 1968)

36

State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1988)

29, 32, 43

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)
State v. Castonguay, 633 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983). . . .

79
9, 18, 19, 24

State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983)

31

State v. Chervenell, 626 P.2d 530 (Wash. App. 1981) . . . .

75

State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984)

26

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), reh'g denied
July 29, 1986

32, 36

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1980)

38, 39, 40

State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502 (Utah 1986)

9

State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)

64

State v. Ellis, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (December 12, 1987). .

70

State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982)

38, 41

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)

78, 79

State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978)

38, 41

State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)

37

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987)

63

vi.

PAGE
CASES CONTINUED
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)

64

State v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 862 (Ariz. 1963)

42

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)

43

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

35

State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985)
State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1979)

67, 68
15, 24, 25

State v. McGuire, 253 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. 1979)

60

State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983)

84

State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1988)

27

State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), reh'g denied
Jan. 8, 1986

29

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983)

9

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977)

36

State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985)
State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968)
State v. Rammell, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)

60, 62, 64
32, 36
70

State v. Rinier, 609 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1980)

80, 81

State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985)

31, 32

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) . . . 29, 41, 45, 46, 77
State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981)

21

State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1986)

46

State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978)

38, 42

State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978)

34, 36

vii.

CASES CONTINUED
PAGE
State v. Tribble, 613 P.2d 173 (Wash. App. 1980)

83

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

47

State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973)

47

State v. Wait, 509 P.2d 372 (Ct. App. Wash 1973)

80

State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 1144 (Conn. 1979) . . . 59, 60, 61, 64
State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979)

32, 33

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982)

20, 21

Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504 (1922) .

9

United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972) . . .

49, 51

United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir. 1976) . . . .

41

United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982) . .

58

United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979)
cert, denied 99 S.Ct. 2894

31

United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982) . . .

28

United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1979). . .

31

United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976). .

28

United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978). .

28

United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . . .

27

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 9120,
18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351,
34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972)
Winebrenner v. United States, 147 P.2d 322 (8th Cir.)
cert denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945)

viii.

69
69
59

PAGE
STATUTES CITED
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)

37

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)

37

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) . . . 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 41
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)

37, 46
7, 53, 56, 58

Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). . . .

5, 26, 27, 28, 29

Rule 611(c), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). . . .

6, 48, 49, 51, 52

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1983)

20

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended)

8

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1953 as amended)

19

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended)

83

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended)

22

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended)

82

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended)

82

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1002 (1953 as amended)

80

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-309 (1953 as amended)

84

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended)

72

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1002 (1953 as amended)

80

Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, §1431 (1983)

81

Calif. Penal Code §459 (West 1970 and Supp 1988)

81

Idaho Code §18-1401 (1987)

82

Idaho Code §18-1402 (1987)

82

ix.

PAGE
STATUTES CONTINUED
Idaho Code §18-1403 (1987)

82

Idaho Code §18-905 (1987)

83

Idaho Code §18-906 (1987)

83

Vt. Stat. Ann. Titl. 13, §11 (1974 Replacement Ed.) . . . .

72, 73

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Article I, §7

63, 79

Utah Constitution, Article I, §12

63

United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment
United States Constitution, Eighth Amendment

7, 59, 62, 69
74

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment
7, 58, 59, 62, 69, 76, 79

x.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(h) whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an
appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment of conviction of a
first degree felony.

In this case final judgment and conviction was

rendered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

xi.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction

for attempted first degree murder?
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

refusing to suppress Mr. Johnson's prior misdemeanor theft
convictions?
3.

Did the trial court err in admitting the bloody

clothing of Trooper Bringhurst because the prejudicial effect of
such evidence outweighed its probative value?
4.

Did the trial court err in admitting the testimony of

Jean Hickham since such testimony was not relevant, served to
confuse the issues and was more prejudicial than probative?
5.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant a

mistrial after Vern Olsen testified that he was guarding Mr. Johnson
to prevent escape attempts?
6.

Did the trial court err in not declaring Lt. Dan

Fallows of the Utah Highway Patrol a hostile or adverse witness when
the defense called him to testify as to prior inconsistent
statements made by Trooper Bringhurst?
7.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it

allowed two fellow officers to testify as to Trooper Bringhurst's
reputation for truthfulness?
8.

Did the premature deliberations by jurors violate Mr.

Johnson's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under the
federal and/or Utah Constitutions?

xii.

ISSUES CONTINUED

9.

Did the trial court err in denying defense counsel's

motions to withdraw and for a mistrial when it became necessary for
her to testify in response to Detective Imig's testimony?
10.

Did the cumulative effect of the errors at trial

warrant reversal of the conviction for attempted murder where the
combined effect of the errors was to bolster Trooper Bringhurst and ^
undermine Mr. Johnson?
11.

Can the conviction for attempted homicide be used as

a triggering offense for an Habitual Criminal charge?
12.

Did the trial court err in admitting documentation

of Mr. Johnson's prior convictions where the state failed to
establish that the pleas were knowing and voluntary?
13.

Did the trial court err in relying on Mr. Johnson's

convictions for vehicle burglary and aggravated assault to prove the
Habitual Criminal charges?

xiii.

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 409 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983):
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983):
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:
:

DANNY LEE JOHNSON,
Appellant,

:

Case No. 870096

:

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Raymond S.
Uno presiding.

A jury found Appellant, Danny Lee Johnson, guilty

following a trial held on January 28, 29, and 30 and February 2, 3,
4, and 5, 1987 of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First
Degree, with the enhancement of Using a Firearm While Committing a
Crime.

Additionally, at a hearing before the Court held on February

9 and 10, 1987, Mr. Johnson was found guilty of Being An Habitual
Criminal, a felony of the First Degree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of May 27, 1986, Trooper
Dennis Bringhurst of the Utah Highway Patrol observed a vehicle
proceed past the 13th South exit from the Interstate 15 freeway,
then make a sharp left hand turn through the "gore" area and onto
the 13th South off ramp.

The vehicle was far enough into the gore

area that it kicked up debris (Transcript of trial, January 28 -

February 10, 1987, hereinafter " T " , 1 p. 60). The trooper followed
the vehicle, which stopped at the red light at the end of the
northbound off ramp (T. 63).
The driver of the vehicle, later identified as Danny Lee
Johnson, first became aware of the trooper while stopped at the end
of the off ramp.

Mr. Johnson looked over, made eye contact with the

officer, and smiled (T. 571-2).

Mr. Johnson continued watching the

officer for a short while because he thought the officer might want
to pull him over because he was drunk (T. 572-3).
According to the trooper, the vehicle remained stationary
while the light turned green and went through a complete cycle to
red again (T. 64). When the light turned green again, Mr. Johnson
turned right and the trooper followed him (T. 66). Trooper
Bringhurst made eye contact with Mr. Johnson, and asked whether he
had been drinking (T. 66). Although Mr. Johnson responded
affirmatively, the trooper was unable to hear him (T. 66, 573).
Trooper Bringhurst told Mr. Johnson to complete his left turn, then
pull over (T. 66, 573-4).
Driving slowly, Mr. Johnson pulled onto Paxton Avenue and
parked his vehicle under a number of overhead lights (T. 73-4, 122,
575).

Mr. Johnson chose the well lit spot because he wanted to

leave his vehicle where it could be clearly visible since he had
several belongings in the car and was unable to roll up the windows
(T. 575).

1

The record cites to the trial held January 28 - February 10, 1987,
are printed in reverse order. To avoid confusion, Appellant cites
to the transcript page numbers ("T") for all transcript cites from
the trial itself. Appellant cites to the record ("R") for all other
cites.
- 2 -

The trooper parked his vehicle approximately one car
length behind Mr. Johnson's car with the passenger side of the
vehicle directly behind the driver's side of Mr. Johnson's vehicle
(T. 72). The trooper exited his vehicle and approached Mr.
Johnson's car in a cocky happy-go-lucky manner because he believed
he was about to make an arrest for driving under the influence
(T. 81-2/ 512). The trooper was unsure of whether he held his
flashlight in his left hand/ as required by police procedures/ or
his right hand (T. 81-2/ 82).
The trooper approached the vehicle and asked "Did you say
you have been drinking?" (T. 83). Mr. Johnson testified that as
Trooper Bringhurst approached Mr. Johnson's vehicle/ Mr. Johnson
smiled in an attempt to be congenial/ then informed the trooper that
he had a gun in the car which he was going to hand out the window
(T. 577-8).

When talking to Lt. Fallows shortly after the incident/

Trooper Bringhurst had difficulty remembering what Mr. Johnson said
to him as he approached the vehicle (T. 535) f however at trial the
trooper testified that Mr. Johnson said "it doesn't make any
difference, does it?"

(T. 83/ 84/ 88).

Trooper Bringhurst then saw the top of a gun (T. 83-4).
The gun did not protrude out the window (T. 142-3).
The trooper reacted when he saw the gun by jumping back/
screwing up his facef taking a couple steps backward/ then going
into a crouch (T. 579). He threw something downr which may have
been his flashlight (T. 579). The trooper testified that he threw
his body backward and landed on his back when he saw the gunf and

-

3 -

was reaching for his own sidearm as he went down (T. 84). However,
Officer Evans witnessed the trooper still standing after three shots
had been fired (T. 224-5).
Six shots were fired altogether.

Mr. Johnson testified

that he opened the door of his car and attempted to get out of the
vehicle after informing the trooper that he was handing out a weapon
(T. 581). Mr. Johnson slipped as he was getting out of the car and,
as he was turning in an attempt to recover his position, Mr. Johnson
saw a movement out of the corner of his eye, then a flash like a
flame shot out from Bringhurst's hip (T. 581). Immediately
thereafter, Mr. Johnson felt something hit his right cheek (T.
581).

The force of the impact spun Mr. Johnson around.

A second or

two later, Mr. Johnson saw another flash from the trooper's gun (T.
582).

Mr. Johnson thereafter fired a shot at the trooper; he did

not recall picking up the shotgun or firing (T. 584).
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he heard a "Boom" and
saw bright light with no images and that the "Boom" was followed by
"Pop pop pop pop pop" (T. 85-86).

Officer Evans however, heard

three shots as he approached, then witnessed Trooper Bringhurst fire
three more rounds into the car (T. 224). The trooper was standing
after the first three shots had been fired, then, as he was firing
the shots, went down into a seated position on the roadway (T.
224-5) .
The trooper did not recall the door to Mr. Johnson's
vehicle being open (T. 145), yet four rounds were found in the
interior of Mr. Johnson's vehicle.

Three of those four shots were

in a

position which would require an open door (T. 369-70).

Furthermore, Mr. Johnson sustained three gunshot wounds to the left
flank (T. 567).
Over defense objection, (R. Ill, 118, 968-9, 973) the
state presented evidence that Mr. Johnson had been angry earlier in
the evening and had telephoned Jean Hickham and allegedly made
threatening statements (T. 714-17).

The state also presented

evidence, again over defense objection, (T. 761-3) as to Trooper
Bringhurstfs character for truthfulness (T. 765, 768).
After the jury convicted Mr. Johnson of Attempted
Homicide, a first degree felony, the state presented evidence of the
Habitual Criminal Charge to the trial Judge (T. 874-84).

That

evidence consisted of a conviction for vehicle burglary in Idaho and
two convictions for escape, in addition to the triggering offense of
Attempted Homicide.

The trial judge convicted Mr. Johnson of Being

an Habitual Criminal (T. 903).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr.
Johnson intended to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst.

In the

alternative, if the court finds sufficient evidence of intent, such
evidence can only support a conviction for manslaughter.
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Johnson's motion to
suppress his misdemeanor theft convictions.

The convictions were

not for crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning
of Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) and their erroneous
admission prejudiced Mr. Johnson.
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The trial court erred in admitting the bloody clothing of
Trooper Bringhurst because its prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value.

The evidence was cumulative and inflamed the jury.

The testimony of Jean Hickham regarding a telephone
conversation several hours prior to the incident was not relevant
since it did not offer any probative information regarding an intent
by Mr. Johnson to kill Trooper Bringhurst.

The testimony was more

prejudicial than probative since it painted a picture of Mr. Johnson
as a violent character; the testimony also substantially confused
the issues.
The trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial
after Officer Olsen testified in response to the prosecutor's direct
question that he was guarding Mr. Johnson to prevent escape
attempts.

Such testimony suggested that Mr. Johnson was a dangerous

and violent man, thereby prejudicing him.
The trial court erred in not declaring Lt. Dan Fallows of
the Utah Highway Patrol a hostile witness or witness associated with
an adverse party under Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983).

A witness need not show actual hostility in order to be

considered adverse under the rule; the fact that Lt. Fallows was
employed by the state, a close associate of Trooper Bringhurst,
reluctant to testify for the defense, and unwilling to meet with
defense counsel without the presence of the prosecutor show that he
was aligned with the state and adverse to the defense.

The trial court committed reversible error in allowing
two officers to testify in rebuttal that Trooper Bringhurst had a
reputation for honesty.

The defense had not attacked the trooper's

credibility and therefore, pursuant to Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983), the evidence was not admissible.

While defense

counsel did cross-examine the trooper regarding prior inconsistent
statements, such examination was not an attack on his credibility
and served only to establish the Trooper's difficulty in remembering
details*
The trial court erred in permitting the jurors to
deliberate in open court early in the trial.

Such early

deliberation violated the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury
and the fourteenth amendment right to due process and a fair trial
under the federal constitution.

The jury was tainted by the early

deliberations thereby denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial.
The early deliberations also violated due process and the
right to an impartial jury under the Utah Constitution.

In the

event this court finds that the federal constitution was not
violated, it nevertheless is free to extend the Utah Constitution to
cover this situation.
The trial court erred in denying defense counsel's
motions to withdraw and for a mistrial when it became necessary for
her to testify in rebuttal to Detective Imig's testimony.

Defense

counsel needed to testify to establish that Imig had told her
information inconsistent with his testimony, which, contrary to the

testimony of Imig at trial, suggested that at the time of the
incident Mr. vjohnson reasonably believed Imig would be interested in
any guns he might procure.
The cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal
where the errors combined to bolster Trooper Bringhurst while
undermining Mr. Johnson.
The Habitual Criminal Statute explicitly excludes murder
as a triggering offense for an "Habitual Criminal11 charge.
Attempted murder is not a separate or different offense from the
substantive offense of murder, and therefore is excluded as a
triggering offense by the language of the statute.
The trial court erred in admitting Mr. Johnson's prior
convictions in support of the Habitual Criminal charge where the
state did not establish that the pleas were knowingly and
voluntarily made.
The prior convictions of Mr. Johnson would not have been
felonies in the State of Utah and therefore cannot support an
Habitual Criminal charge.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION
FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
In order to convict Mr. Johnson of attempted first degree
murder, the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended).

One of the elements of first degree murder is that the defendant
intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of another.
See State v. Dumasy 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1986).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
will "view the evidence. . ., including all reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to. . . conviction [ ]" and
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence " . . . only when
the evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

A.

THE EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CAUSE TROOPER
BRINGHURSTfS DEATH IS INSUFFICIENT.

"'The law does not presume because an assault was made
with a weapon likely to produce death, that it was an assault with
the intent to murder.'"

State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d at 1323, 1326

(Utah 1983) (quoting Thacker v. Commonweath, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E.
504, 505 (1922)).

Therefore, evidence of intent other than the use

of a weapon is required to sustain the conviction for attempted
homicide.
1.

Evidence of Intent is Inherently Improbable.

In determining whether the state introduced sufficient
evidence to establish that Danny Lee Johnson intended to kill
Trooper Bringhurst, the ten or so seconds from the point at which
Trooper Bringhurst first saw the muzzle of the gun move across
Mr. Johnson's lap while he was seated inside the car to the moment
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the last shot was fired (T. 265, 298) are critical.

Trooper

Bringhurst and Danny Lee Johnson are the only two individuals who
observed the entire incident.

In addition, the testimony of Officer

Evans who observed a portion of the incident and the physical
evidence offer an indication of what actually occurred during those
crucial seconds.
Danny Lee Johnson testified that when the Officer
approached his vehicle, Mr. Johnson smiled in an attempt to be
congenial, then informed the trooper that he was handing a weapon
out the window (T. 577). Mr. Johnson testified that he then reached
with his left hand for the shotgun which was on the seat next to
him, and lifted the gun across his lap (T. 578). He did not have a
rear view mirror on the driver's door, so he turned to see the
trooper (T. 579). The trooper saw the gun, jumped back, threw aside
his flashlight and reached for his gun (T. 579-80).

Danny let go of

the shotgun and asked the trooper what was the matter (T. 580). The
trooper did not respond, and Danny moved to get out of the car
(T. 580-1).

As he got out of the car, he slipped, then turned to

face the trooper just as he saw a flame fly out from the trooper's
hip (T. 581). This first shot hit Danny in the cheek and spun him
around (T. 581). A couple of seconds later he saw the trooper fire
again then felt a second shot hit his flank (T. 582).
Mr. Johnson based his defense on this testimony that the
trooper fired first and that Mr. Johnson responded to save his
life.

If Trooper Bringhurst, not Mr. Johnson, fired the first shot,
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then it cannot be established that Mr. Johnson intended to kill the
Trooper.
In order to find the necessary intent, the jury must have
disbelieved the testimony of Mr. Johnson, and believed the testimony
of Trooper Bringhurst.

However, the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst

is inherently improbable when viewed in conjunction with the
testimony of Officer Evans and the physical evidence.
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he approached Mr.
Johnson's car that night "in a carefree happy go lucky mannerff
(T. 82). He told Lieutenant Fallows that he felt "cocky, I was sure
I had a drunk" (T. 512).
In such an uncautious state of mind, the trooper
approached Mr. Johnsonfs car.

The trooper testified that at that

point he asked Mr. Johnson, "Did you say you have been drinking?",
and that Mr. Johnson replied, "It doesn't make any difference, does
it?" (T. 83). Yet, the trooper told Lieutenant Fallows shortly
after the incident, "Hell, I wish I could remember what he said."
(T. 535). Mr. Johnson testified that he responded to the trooper's
question by telling him that he was going to hand the weapon out the
window (T. 577).
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he saw Mr. Johnson pick
up a gun (T. 83), then saw the "muzzle and part of the barrel as it
came up over his lap" (T. 84). The trooper never saw the barrel
outside the window of Mr. Johnson's car nor the gun actually
pointing at him (T. 142-3).

According to Trooper Bringhurst, the
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moment he saw the gun, he threw himself backward toward the ground
(T. 84).
The trooper testified further that he heard a loud
explosion or boom as he was going down (T. 84-85),

As he went down,

he was reaching for his sidearm, and never had the weapon out before
hitting the ground (T. 147, 84-85).

The trooper heard the boom,

followed by five pops (T. 86). The implication of the Trooper's
testimony is that Danny Lee Johnson fired the first shot or boom as
the trooper went down to the ground and that while on the ground,
the trooper fired his five shots in rapid succession.
Such testimony is inherently improbable because it
directly contradicts the testimony of another police officer who
witnessed a portion of the events.

Officer Evans heard three shots

as he approached Paxton Ave. (T. 222, 251-2).

When he arrived,

Trooper Bringhurst was still standing (T. 254-5).

The trooper fired

three more shots into the car; as he was firing those three shots,
Officer Evans observed the trooper moving backwards and going to the
ground (T. 225, 254-5).

Officer Evans1 testimony establishes that

Trooper Bringhurst had his gun out and was firing while still
standing, contrary to the trooper's testimony that his gun did not
come out until after Mr. Johnson fired.
Trooper Bringhurst's ability to perceive and recall the
details of the incident was impacted by his reaction to the
incident; the extent of that impact is evidenced by the fact that he
"blacked out" from the time the first shot was fired or could not
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remember what happened until the time he fired his last shot
(T. 86-7).

Officer Evans, however, was not a participant in the

incident and his ability to perceive and recall the details was not
affected by his involvement and emotional reaction.

His perceptions

as a trained police officer observing the scene cannot be totally
disregarded yet, in order to have found intent, the jury must have
done so.
Trooper Bringhurst's version is also inherently
improbable because the physical evidence contradicts it. Four
bullets went into the interior of Mr. Johnson's car (T. 369-70,
330-3).

Three of the four bullets could not have been fired with

the door closed (T. 364). Nevertheless, the trooper recalled that
the door was closed throughout the incident (T. 145). In addition,
if the trooper were down as he had testified, bullets or bullet
holes would have been found in the drivers door. Furthermore, Mr.
Johnson's wounds in his left flank over his pelvic bone from back to
front (T. 567-8) required that the trooper shoot directly into Mr.
Johnson's back with the door open.

Finally the trajectory of the

bullets required that the door be opened, since none of the bullets
appeared to have been fired at an up or down angle (T. 329, 330-33).
At the time of his last shot, the trooper remembers
seeing Mr. Johnson "seated behind the wheel.
is all that showed up above the door.
fired a shot.

His head and his neck

I raised my pistol, . . . and

As I fired the shot, Danny Lee disappeared into the

interior of the vehicle."

(T. 87). Trooper Bringhurst did not

recall the driver's car door being open at any time during the
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incident. (T. 145). This directly contradicts Officer Evans'
observations since he did not see Mr. Johnson at all (T. 227), which
suggests that Mr. Johnson was down by the time the fourth shot was
fired.2
In order for the jury to find specific intent based on
Trooper Bringhurst's testimony, the jury must have completely
disregarded Officer Evans1 testimony.

The trooper could not have

immediately thrown himself back on the ground, and still been
standing three shots later when Officer Evans saw him.

Nor did his

gun come out only after he had hit the ground, as Trooper Bringhurst
testified.
This incident occurred during a very brief period of
time.

The trooper acknowledged that he "blacked out" or could not

remember what had transpired from the first shot to the last
(T. 86-7).

This comports with Mr. Johnson's testimony that the

trooper seemed to panic when he saw the gun and did not thereafter
respond to Mr. Johnson's statements.
The only way the jury could have returned a guilty
verdict would have been to accept the trooper's testimony up to the

2

Contrary to the testimony of her own witnesses, the prosecutor
speculated in closing that Mr. Johnson opened the door after firing
the initial shot and was then shot by the trooper (T. 816-17). The
events occurred in a brief ten second period, not giving Mr. Johnson
time to get out and back into the car as the prosecutor further
speculated. Such argument is not supported by the testimony of
Trooper Bringhurst.
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point where he saw the gun, and reject the portion involving
throwing himself back, firing only after he was on the ground with
the car door closed; and then accept the physical evidence and
Officer Evans1 testimony which establish that the events could not
have occurred the way in which Bringhurst testified they occurred.
To pick and discard Trooper Bringhurst's testimony in this way is to
Tf

fragment the testimony in such a degree as to distort it."

v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 285 (N.M. 1979) (citations omitted).

State
A

finding of intent, the crucial issue of this case, cannot be based
on a distortion.
Also significant to the intent issue is the fact that Mr.
Johnson chose a brightly lit spot to park his vehicle.

Trooper

Bringhurst testified that after following Mr. Johnson off of the
interstate, he directed Mr. Johnson "to complete his left-hand turn
and pull over to the right-hand shoulder of the road."

(T. 66).

The trooper then followed Mr. Johnson a short distance at a "slow
pace" to Paxton Avenue where Mr. Johnson pulled over in a "well lit"
area where there were "a lot of street lights" (T. 68, 74, 122). It
is improbable that Mr. Johnson would have consciously selected the
best lit location in the vicinity to pull over if he had intended to
kill Trooper Bringhurst.

Mr. Johnson's selection of a brightly lit

spot supports his testimony that he knew he was going to be arrested
and wanted a well lit place to leave his car so that his belongings
would not be stolen (T. 575).
The testimony of Jean Hickham is the only other testimony
from which the jury arguably might have found intent.
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Ms. Hickham's

testimony was admitted over vigorous objection to its relevance, its
evidence of character, and its prejudicial impact (T. 661-64).

The

trial court denied that motion and found the testimony admissible
for the purpose of showing motive, opportunity and intent (T. 679,
691).

As argued infra at 35-41, such testimony was not probative of

whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot Trooper Bringhurst, was more
prejudicial than probative since it painted Mr. Johnson as a violent
character and served to confuse the issues since the jury may have
considered the alleged threat as evidence that Mr. Johnson intended
to shoot Bringhurst even though the threat did not deal directly
with Trooper Bringhurst and there was no evidence that Mr. Johnson
was carrying out the earlier threat or that Bringhurst got in the
way of Mr. Johnson's attempts to carry out the earlier threat.
The evidence of specific intent based on Ms. Hickhamfs
testimony is inherently improbable.

The prosecution attempted to

elicit from Ms. Hickman supposed threatening statements made to her
by Mr. Johnson earlier in the day in question.

Ms. Hickham's

roommate at the time was Mr. Johnson's girlfriend (T. 705). Ms.
Hickham testified that Mr. Johnson was upset on the telephone that
night because his girlfriend was seeing a man named Mr. Polton
(T. 714). Ms. Hickham testified that Mr. Johnson was quite
intoxicated at the time, but that "It's kind of hard for me to
remember that certain night, because I had been drinking myself."
(T. 717). In fact, Ms. Hickham had been drinking tequila for five
hours before speaking with Mr. Johnson (T. 723-24).
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Ms. Hickham testified to several specific threats Mr.
Johnson made on the telephone toward Mr. Polton to be carried out at
the apartment building (T. 714-17).

She also stated that she heard

the clicking of a gun in the background (T. 717). After ending the
conversation with Mr. Johnson, the police were called (T. 718). The
prosecution attempted to elicit from Ms. Hickham what she told the
police that evening about her conversation with Mr. Johnson:
Q. (By Ms. Knight-Eagan) Did you tell Deputy
Wilden what Danny Johnson had said over the
telephone?11
A. I really don't want to answer because I don't
know — I was in a state of mind to where I could
have said other things that he did not say, because
when you're upset you do say some things and you
exaggerate a little bit more than what is going on.
(T. 719).
The reluctant testimony of Ms. Hickham does not establish
that Mr. Johnson had the specific intent to cause the death of
Trooper Bringhurst.

Ms. Hickham was intoxicated and upset when she

subsequently spoke to Officer Wilden (T. 728) and stated flatly that
she "could have said other things that he did not say" (T. 719).
She specifically stated that Mr. Johnson did not tell her that he
would shoot an officer who interfered with his attempts to carry out
the threats, and acknowledged that if that were conveyed to the
police, she, not Danny, had suggested it (T. 721). Ms. Hickman
testified that she probably could have told the officer things that
Mr. Johnson did not say. (T. 730). Even if any of the statements
were accurate, they were not threats against Trooper Bringhurst,
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and, therefore, cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to
harm the trooper.
The Utah Supreme Court found the evidence of specific
intent insufficient to support a charge of attempted first degree
murder in State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983).
therein stated:

The Court

"In virtually all cases we have examined where an

attempt conviction was upheld, the defendant had either voiced or
threatened his intent or else conducted himself in such unambiguous
ways as to not reasonably allow for any other mens rea."

i^d. at 1326

The facts in the instant case are comparable to those in
Castonguay.

The defendant in Castonguay "testified that he harbored

no ill will against (the) officer, and had never shot a human
being."

Id.

at 1326. Likewise, Mr. Johnson did not express an

intent to kill Trooper Bringhurst at the time of the incident, or at
any other time and testified that he was not angry at the trooper on
that evening (T. 650). The officer in Castonguay "did not see the
defendant's gun, let alone see the defendant point the gun at him at
the time the alleged . . . shot was fired."

663 P.2d at 1326. The

instant case is identical to Castonguay on this crucial point.
Trooper Bringhurst did not see Mr. Johnson's gun, let alone see Mr.
Johnson point the gun directly at him, at the time that the shot was
fired.

The officer in Castonguay did not see a muzzle blast.

Id.

Trooper Bringhurst did not testify that he saw a muzzle blast of
fire.

He testified only that he saw "bright light" (T. 85). He

also testified that the area where the incident occurred
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was

ff

[w]ell lit.

There's alot of street lights in that area" (T.

122) .
The Court further noted in Castonguay that the defendant
could easily have killed the officer if that had been his intent.
663 P.2d at 1326.

In the instant case, before he drove away Mr.

Johnson could have picked up the loaded gun sitting on the seat next
to him and killed Trooper Bringhurst if that had been his
intention.

The trooper had fired all of his bullets and was lying

on the ground.

If Mr. Johnson had wanted to kill him, he had the

perfect opportunity to do so.

Mr. Johnson did not take that

opportunity because he did not have the specific intent to kill
Trooper Bringhurst.

Mr. Johnson asks this Court to find, as it did

in Castonguay, that the evidence presented is insufficient to
support a finding of specific intent, and therefore, insufficient to
support the conviction of attempted first degree murder.
2.

Mr. Johnson's Level of Intoxication Negates
the Finding of a Specific Intent to Kill
Trooper Bringhurst.

In addition to the fact that the evidence offered by the
prosecution to show specific intent was inherently improbable, both
the prosecution and defense offered evidence which negated such an
intent.

Under Utah law, "voluntary intoxication shall not be a

defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense."
Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-306 (1953 as amended).

This Court explained

that "[e]vidence of intoxication must have relevance to the
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defendant's mental state at the time of the crime."

State v. Wood,

648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted).
Mr. Johnson's intoxication at the time of the incident
was so incapacitating that he could not have had the specific intent
to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst.
that he consumed

Mr. Johnson testified

fl

[q]uite an amount of whiskey, I would say a liter

and a fifth" (T. 570) on the day in question.

Indeed, Mr. Johnson's

intoxication was so obvious that Trooper Bringhurst felt "cocky, I
was sure I had a drunk."

(T. 512). Ms. Hickham testified that Mr.

Johnson was "quite intoxicated" earlier that evening (T. 717). The
medical report showed that at 2:00 a.m. on May 27, 1986, after
having been shot and losing a great deal of blood, Mr. Johnson's
blood alcohol was .203 per cent (T. 567-8).

Mr. Johnson's blood

alcohol was almost three times higher than the legal level of
intoxication.

See Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1983).

The Utah Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of
intoxication to negate the specific intent in State v. Wood.
"Although Wood had imbibed some alcohol, there is no evidence he was
so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he was unable to form
the specific intent necessary . . ."

648 P.2d at 90. The instant

case is distinguishable from Wood because there is significantly
more evidence of Mr. Johnson's intoxication at the time of the
incident.

Unlike the instant case, the evidence of Mr. Wood's

intoxication "was not altogether consistent."

Id. at 90. Mr. Wood

had only had two drinks on the night in question, whereas Mr.
Johnson had consumed an entire liter and a fifth.
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Id. at 90. Also

unlike the instant case, in Wood there was no medical report nor any
testimony showing intoxication.

Id.

at 90.

The evidence of intoxication was stronger in State v.
Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981) than it was in Wood, but not as
strong as in the instant case.

Mr. Sisneros testified to having

drunk far less alcohol than Mr. Johnson.

]jd. at 858. Additionally,

the police officers only thought that Mr. Sisneros "seemed to be
under the influence of alcohol . . .[he] responded to questions and
followed instructions."

Id.

The instant case is distinguishable

from Sisneros not only because Mr. Johnson claimed to have consumed
much more alcohol, but because that claim is corroborated by Trooper
Bringhurst's testimony, Jean Hickham's testimony and the clear-cut
physical evidence of the blood alcohol test.
Mr. Johnson could not have maintained the specific intent
to cause the death of Trooper Bringhurst in such a a dangerously
high level of intoxication.

The totality of the evidence, including

the inherently improbable testimonies of the trooper and Ms. Hickham
and the completely corroborated evidence of overwhelming
intoxication, does not support the finding of specific intent.
Reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Johnson formulated the specific intent to kill Trooper Bringhurst.
Absent a showing of such intent, the evidence is insufficient to
support Mr. Johnson's conviction for attempted first degree murder.
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B.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF INTENT, SUCH EVIDENCE CAN ONLY
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED MANSLAUGHTER.

Although Mr. Johnson maintains that the evidence does not
support a finding of the intent element, in the event this Court
disagrees, the evidence nevertheless cannot support a conviction for
attempted first degree murder because Mr. Johnson "reasonably
believefd] the circumstances provide[d] a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances."
Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended).

Utah

The evidence of this tragic

incident shows that Mr. Johnson was shot in the back by Trooper
Bringhurst before Mr. Johnson wounded the trooper.

Under those

circumstances, Mr. Johnson reasonably believed he was justified in
defending his life.

Because of such a reasonable belief, Mr.

Johnson is not guilty of and should not have been convicted of
attempted first degree murder.

If his self-defending conduct is to

be punished at all it can only be for the crime of attempted
manslaughter.
The evidence shows that Trooper Bringhurst panicked when
he saw the gun in Mr. Johnson's car.

The trooper approached the car

that night "in a carefree, happy-go-lucky" manner. (T. 82). He felt
"cocky" that he was about to arrest a drunk (T. 512). In such a
carefree state, Trooper Bringhurst claimed to see the gun move
across Mr. Johnson's lap and reacted by "starting to move" (T. 84).
Bringhurst remembered seeing a "bright light" at this moment' the
bright light was the last thing he remembered seeing (T. 84-6).
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Trooper Bringhurst did not remember firing his first
shot.

He only remembered seeing Mr. Johnson's gun, seeing a bright

light and hearing a loud noise.

In that instant of surprise,

shocking him out of his "happy-go-lucky" frame of mind, the trooper
was convinced that he was going to be killed (T. 148). At that
moment the trooper distinctly remembered throwing his body backwards
and reaching for his gun (T. 84-5).
Although Trooper Bringhurst did not remember pulling the
trigger, he fired four shots at Mr. Johnson.

Trooper Bringhurst

remembered only the sound of the gunfire (T. 86). The next thing
the trooper remembered was looking at Mr. Johnson seated behind the
wheel in his car with the car door closed (T. 86-87).

He then aimed

and fired his fifth and final shot at Mr. Johnson (T. 86-87).
The only other person who witnessed the events of those
crucial moments was Officer Evans.

Officer Evans was less than one

block away from the scene when he heard the first shot (T. 223).
The officer heard two more shots before he reached Paxton Avenue (T.
224).

Officer Evans testified that he could not distinguish between

the sounds of the shots "other than that they were very loud and
were very close to where I was at."

(T. 225).

When he arrived at the scene, he saw Trooper Bringhurst
"fire three more rounds into the car" (T. 224). Officer Evans saw
the trooper standing "approximately two feet to the side of the
vehicle and he was a couple of feet behind the driver's door" when
he first saw him fire into Mr. Johnson's car (T. 225). Officer
Evans did not remember whether the driver's door was open or closed
(T. 227).

The objective physical evidence is the only other
evidence pertaining to these critical moments.

The physical

evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson was shot in the back more
than once (T. 567-568) and that Mr. Johnson could not have been
seated in his car with the door closed when he was hit (T. 364,
568).

Mr. Johnson was either outside the car as he testified (T.

579-580)/ or turned around while seated in the car so his back was
directly facing Trooper Bringhurst.
What happened during the crucial moments when both
Trooper Bringhurst and Mr. Johnson were wounded is decisive of
whether Mr. Johnson is guilty of the crime for which he was
sentenced or the lesser crime of attempted manslaughter.

If Trooper

Bringhurst shot Mr. Johnson first in a moment of panic and lack of
consciousness, Mr. Johnson was reasonable in his belief that he had
a right to shoot back in an attempt to save his own life. Mr.
Johnson testified to the jury that he was shot first as he was
attempting to get out of his car (T. 581). Mr. Johnson's
recollection of those moments is corroborated by the physical facts
and the testimony of Officer Evans.
The evidence of reasonable belief of a right to shoot in
self-defense was found insufficient to warrant an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter in State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1979)
(cited with approval in State v. Castonguay.)

Manus is

distinguishable on the facts from the instant case.
assessed the evidence in Manus:

The Court

The State's evidence showed that Manus was angry
about the officer stopping his wife, got his
shotgun, loaded it, approached the scene in a trot
with a loaded gun, had some words with the officers,
refused to put his shotgun down when told to do so,
pointed the shotgun at Switzer, and ultimately fired
at Wasmer, after which he threatened that he would
"get" Switzer also.
Manus, 587 P.2d at 285. The State's evidence in the instant case
does not show that Mr. Johnson was angry with Trooper Bringhurst.
The evidence does not show that Trooper Bringhurst instructed Mr.
Johnson to put the gun down nor that Trooper Bringhurst gave Mr.
Johnson a chance to comply with such an instruction.

The evidence

does not show that Mr. Johnson pointed the gun at the trooper.

The

evidence does not show that Mr. Johnson ever voiced any threats
toward Trooper Bringhurst or Officer Evans or any other officer on
the scene that night.
Unlike Manus, the evidence in the instant case shows that
Trooper Bringhurst panicked and started shooting without pausing to
see or hear any of Mr. Johnson's actions, let alone pausing to
instruct Mr. Johnson to put down the gun and get out of the car.
The evidence shows that Trooper Bringhurst fired four shots before
he assessed what was happening.

The only evidence of the trooper

being shot first is the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst, and he does
not remember what happened.

The evidence in this case supports a

conviction for nothing more than attempted manslaughter.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REFUSING TO SUPPRESS MR. JOHNSONfS MISDEMEANOR
THEFT CONVICTIONS.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress Mr.
Johnson's prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence (1983) (R. 204-5).

The trial court refused to suppress

two prior misdemeanor convictions for theft, ruling that they were
crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2)/ Utah
Rules of Evidence (1983).3 (R. 1529).
The trial court relied on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33
(Utah 1984) in determining that the prior misdemeanor theft
convictions were admissible (R. 1527).

However, Cintron is not

controlling in determining whether theft is a crime of dishonesty
since Cintron was decided under the rules of evidence which were in
effect prior to the adoption of the federal rules.

The federal

rules were to provide a fresh starting place for the law of
evidence, were to supplant all inconsistent rules and statutes and

3

On direct examination, Mr. Johnson acknowledged the two prior
misdemeanor theft convictions after the trial court denied the
motion to suppress such convictions (T. 659). Policy considerations
and fundamental fairness demand that where a motion to suppress
prior convictions is denied, a defendant be permitted to bring out
such convictions on direct examination, while preserving the issue
for appeal. To do otherwise would grant unwarranted advantage to
the State. The jury would doubtfully understand a legal
technicality forbidding the defendant from being completely truthful
and honest with the jury about prior convictions; and when such
information was "uncovered" by the State on cross examination, the
jury would unconsciously, if not consciously, discount the
credibility of the defendant. The jury would infer from the
defendant's conduct an intent on his part to hide or hope to hide
the information of prior convictions.

were to be interpreted by looking to federal case law.

See State v.

Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).
Rule 609(a)(2)# Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) is a
verbatim replica of the federal rule. While there is a split of
authority among the federal circuits as to whether burglary and
theft are crimes of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning
of Rule 609(a)(2), the "more persuasive and better reasoned . . .
decisions hold [ ] that burglary and theft not arising from
fraudulent conduct are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement"
under the rule.

See State v. Morehouse/ 748 P.2d 217 (Ut. App.

1988) (J. Jackson, dissenting at 222 n. 2 ) .
In United States v. Smith/ 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
which this Court cited favorably in State v. Banner/ the circuit
court discussed in detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a)
pointing out the heated debate which spawned the formulation of the
rule.

That court quoted the Conference Committee Report which

stated:
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the
Conference means crimes such as perjury or
subornation of perjury/ false statement, criminal
fraud, embezzlement/ or false pretensef or any other
offense in the nature of crimen falsi/ the
commission of which involves some element of deceit,
untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
accused's propensity to testify truthfully.
Smith, 551 F.2d at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, pp. 7098, 7103).

The intent of Congress was to limit the

introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to
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those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not
tell the truth.
In United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1976), the court reasoned:
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element
of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say
that either offense, in the language of the
Conference Committee, is "peculiarly probative of
credibility.11 Although it may be argued that any
wilful violation of law. . . evinces a lack of
character and a disregard for all legal duties,
including the obligations of an oath, Congress has
not accepted that expansive theory.
535 F.2d at 123.
In United States v. Glenn, 667 P.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982),
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not
admissible under Rule 609 (a)(2) without a showing of accompanying
fraudulent or deceitful conduct.
make such a showing.

The burden rests with the State to

Generally, the court observed that crimes of

violence, theft crimes and crimes of stealth do not involve
"dishonesty or false statement" within the proper meaning of Rule
609 (a)(2).

See also United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th

Cir. 1978).
The Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction for felony
theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under Rule 609
(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon the propensity of a
witness to testify truthfully.

The court stated that felony theft

does not involve "dishonesty or false statement" of the
credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2).
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In the present case, neither of the misdemeanor theft
convictions should have been admitted.

The 1985 misdemeanor theft

conviction contained no element of deceit and, under the cases
outlined above, was inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(2),

The

circumstances of the 1982 theft by deception conviction were not
established by the state. While the prosecutor did attempt to
proffer the circumstances of that theft (after the Court's ruling)
(R. 1526-7), no evidence was presented and the trial court
disregarded that attempted proffer, ruling that theft in general fit
within 609(a)(2) (R. 1525-9).
Mr. Johnson's defense was based in part on his testimony
that Trooper Bringhurst fired first.
14, 23)

(See discussion supra at 4,

Mr. Johnson's credibility was therefore of utmost

importance.

The state emphasized Mr. Johnson's convictions, arguing

in closing that "We know Danny Johnson is a dishonest man" because
of his prior convictions (R. 713). This Court has acknowledged the
prejudicial effect of prior convictions in State v. Pacheco, 712
P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) reh'g denied, January 8, 1986, and State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985).

Furthermore, as Justice

Zimmerman pointed out in his concurring opinion in State v. Bishop,
75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47 (1988):
This Court's decisions have consistently recognized
that an accused is almost certainly prejudiced
unfairly when evidence of unrelated crimes or bad
acts is introduced because of "the tendency of a
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad
character rather than because he [or she] is shown
to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. For this reason, "such
evidence is presumed prejudicial and, absent a
reason for the admission of the evidence other than
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is
excluded." id.
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Because the trial court erred in allowing evidence of Mr. Johnson's
misdemeanor theft convictions, resulting in prejudice since the
jury's perception as to whether Mr. Johnson intentionally committed
the crime was undoubtedly affected by its knowledge of his prior
convictions, the conviction in the present case should be reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE BLOODY
CLOTHING OF TROOPER BRINGHURST BECAUSE THE
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH EVIDENCE
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED THE PROBATIVE VALUE.
Over defense objection, the trial court admitted into
evidence as state's exhibits 41 and 42, the bloody clothing Trooper
Bringhurst wore on the night of the incident (T. 159-60, 175).
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp. 1984).
In deciding whether a piece of evidence should be
excluded under Rule 403, the trial court must determine whether the
item has probative value and, if so, whether that probative value is
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such
evidence.

The trial court abused its discretion in the instant case

in finding that the probative value of the bloody clothing was equal

to or greater than the prejudicial effect and therefore admissible
under Rule 403 (T. 160).
In deciding whether an item of evidence has probative
value, two central considerations are, first, "how strong a
tendency" the proffered evidence has to prove an issue of
consequence in the litigation, and second, the proponent's need for
the evidence.
Cir. 1979).

United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th

As this Court stated, relevance is determined according

to whether the evidence will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the nature of the crime or the manner in which a crime
was committed.

State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985).

In State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983) the court
held the trial court erred by admitting pictures of the deceased
victim because the photographs did not have probative value as to
whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator.

The fact that

the victim was killed, the medical cause of his death, and what was
done with his body after death were not in controversy.

The court

held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
photographs since they had little probative value and were
cumulative of undisputed testimony.
In United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.
1979) cert, denied 99 S.Ct. 2894, the Court stressed the necessity
when considering the probative value of evidence, of assessing the
prosecutor's need for the evidence.

The Court of Appeals considered

the value of prior crime evidence, commenting:
When the government has ample evidence to establish
an element of the crime, the probative value of the
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prior crime evidence is greatly reduced, and the
risk of prejudice which accompanies the admission of
such evidence will not be justified.
Similarly, in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah
1988), this Court reasoned that photographs showing the head wounds
of victim Cunningham were improperly admitted under Rule 403 as the
evidence had minimal probative value, "being essentially cumulative
of unchallenged expert and lay testimony identifying the remains and
the causes of death".

Id.

at 29.

In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986), reh'g
denied, July 29, 1986, this Court noted that before prejudicial
photographs may be admitted, it must be established that the
evidence "conveyfs] relevant information that cannot readily be
provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial means."

Id.

(citing State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979)).4
While clothing may be allowed as an exhibit, it should be
allowed in as evidence only if it assists the trier of fact in
understanding the nature of the crime charged or how that crime was
committed.

Royball, 710 P.2d at 168. Further, a victim's clothing

has been allowed in as evidence when it connects an accused with a

4

In State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968) this Court found the
inflammatory nature of photographs of the victim outweighed their
probative value, concluding:
In the instant case they have no probative value. All
the material facts which could conceivably have been
adduced from a viewing of the slides had been established
by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The only
purpose served was to inflame and arouse the jury.
Id. at 515.
cont. on page 33
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crime, proves an individual's identity, or throws relevant light on
a material matter at issue.
Crim. App. 1973).

Jennings v. State, 506 P.2d 931 (Okl.

But a victim's clothing is not to be admitted

when it does not shed light on a relevant fact and its chief effect
is one of arousing passion and prejudice in the individual jurors'
minds.

Id.
In the present case, the bloody clothing had no probative

value in regard to any of the issues raised at trial. The defense
did not contest that the shooting occurred, that Trooper Bringhurst
was injured or the extent of the trooper's injuries (T. 159-60).
The state in essence conceded that the bloody clothing was merely
cumulative, and was not necessary to an issue raised at trial when
it acknowledged that the clothing was only needed to "corroborate"
Bringhurst's testimony (T. 160).
In addition to Bringhurst's testimony, the state had the
benefit of the testimony of lay and expert witnesses to establish

4 cont.
In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), the court
weighed the impact of acceptance into evidence photographs of the
murder victim's bullet wound when there was no dispute as to the
shooting or cause of death. Even though the conviction was affirmed
the court stated:
Because the defendant did not dispute shooting Dirks, and
because the medical examiner testified that the victim
died as a result of the gunshot, the admission of the
photographs was superfluous. We do not condone the
admission of the photographs in this case, since we are
able to find no evidentiary value for the photographs
other than the hoped for emotional impact on the jury.
Id. at 813.
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the nature and extent of Bringhurst's injuries.

Dr. Bryce Allred

testified to the extent of Bringhurst's wounds and the treatment Dr.
Allred performed (T. 185, 194-5).

Exhibit 35, a photograph, showed

the shotgun pellet wounds on Bringhurst's face and ear (T. 185).
Exhibits 36 and 37 were photographs of Bringhurst on the day of his
discharge from the hospital (T. 202).
In State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978), the trial
court allowed into evidence a bloodstained shirt of a victim of a
shooting as the prosecution had stated they believed the bloodied
shirt was "corroborative of the entire situation."

Id. at 1278.

The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting such clothing, and stated:
The admission of gruesome objects such as
photographs, clothing, and weapons, when introduced
for no other purpose than to inflame and arouse the
passions of the jury, can lead to a conviction
resulting from the jury's revulsion and not from the
state's proving the elements of the crime.
Id. at 1276.
While the court in Steele added that gruesome evidence is
admissible when the probative value outweighs the potential to
prejudice the jury, the court stated that if the sole purpose of an
item of evidence is to prejudice the jury, "we will not hesitate to
reverse on appeal."

Id.

The reviewing court found that the bloody

shirt added little, if anything, to the state's case and
acknowledged that while cumulative evidence is permissible in
certain situations, where evidence adds nothing for the juror's
consideration and is intended to arouse and inflame the emotions of
the jury, it is reversible error.

lei. at 1278.
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In this case, where

the bloody clothing added nothing for the jury's consideration, it
had no probative value and the trial court erred in admitting it.
Even if this court determines that the bloody clothing
had some minimal probative value, it is inadmissible under Rule 403
if that probative value is substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial effect.

In determining whether evidence unduly

prejudices a defendant under Rule 403, the focus is on whether the
evidence has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper
basis, such as an emotional determination rather than a factual
one.

Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Federal Rules of

Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102.

id.

at 1216.

In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), in the
context of gruesome photographs, this Court recognized that:
inherent in certain categories of relevant evidence
is an unusually strong propensity to unfairly
prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. Evidence in
these categories is uniquely subject to being used
to distort the deliberative process and improperly
skew the outcome. Consequently, when evidence
falling within such a category is offered, we have
required a showing of unusual probative value before
it is admissible.
Id. at 1267.
The prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing
substantially outweighed any minimal probative value.

Trooper

Bringhurst received a head injury, spilling blood onto his
clothing.

Rather than allowing uncontested testimony regarding

Bringhurst's wounds to suffice, the court admitted the clothing
Bringhurst was wearing at the time of the shooting.

Such evidence

was inflammatory, conjuring up a myriad of possible interpretations

- 35

-

for even the most objective of jurors and arousing sympathy and
support for Bringhurst.

The vivid display of blood and gore would

affect the emotions of even the coldest juror.

Because the

prejudicial effect of the bloody clothing outweighed any probative
value, the trial court erred in admitting it.
The trial court's error in admitting the bloody clothing
is grounds for reversal.

In numerous cases, appellate courts have

reversed a conviction where the probative value of evidence is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, especially in situations where
the evidence was introduced for its inflammatory effect.

See

generally State v. Beers, 448 P.2d 104 (Ariz. App. 1968); Oxendine
v. State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); State v. Poe, 441
P.2d 512 (Utah 1968); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986); and
State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978).
The standard for reversal is whether there exists a
reasonable probability or likelihood that there would have been a
result more favorable to the defendant in absence of the error.
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977).
In the present case, where Mr. Johnson's defense was
based on lack of intent.

Mr. Johnson testified that Trooper

Bringhurst had panicked and shot him before Johnson fired a shot
(T. 579, 581).

Under such circumstances, a reasonable likelihood

exists that the result would have been more favorable had the bloody
clothing which aroused sympathy and support for the injured trooper
and inflamed the jury not been admitted into evidence.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM.
Defense counsel made a pretrial motion to exclude the
testimony of Jean Hickham (R. 111). The trial court denied the
motion (R. 118). Defense counsel renewed the motion prior to Ms.
Hickham's testimony, arguing that the testimony was not relevant and
was not related to the shooting and, in the alternative, even if it
were relevant, the probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial
effect of the testimony (T. 592-4).

The trial court denied the

motion on the grounds that the statements were relevant and the
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect (T. 597).
A.

THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT RELEVANT.

Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
402, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence is controlling in determining relevance.
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986).

Rule

State v. Gray,

Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as

follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
In addition, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
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In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah 1982),
this Court emphasized that "evidence is admissible if, and only if,
it is relevant to prove some fact that is material to the crime
charged."
In State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978), this Court
pointed out that evidence that a witness had lied on previous
occasions, had resigned from his position as a deputy sheriff under
pressure and had not followed proper procedures regarding the
turning in of narcotics was not relevant to the determination of
guilt or innocence of the defendant, and stated that

ff

[t]he better

reasoned cases hold that conduct where no conviction is had is not
admissible to impeach a witness."

Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).

In State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978), the
state introduced evidence of prior complaints against the defendant
for the articulated purpose of attacking the defendant's
credibility.

This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial,

stating that "[b]are, unproven allegations or 'complaints1 of prior
incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to the issue of
defendant's truthfulness or veracity."

Goodliffe at 1290. Hence,

the unproven allegations of Jean Hickham were not admissible to
attack Mr. Johnson's credibility.
In State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1980), this
Court pointed out that it had "stated on numerous occasions that
evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant is not
admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person
of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely
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to have committed the crime charged."

However, the Daniels Court

found that the trial court had not erred in admitting evidence that
the defendant had stolen gasoline in order to drive a vehicle from
Utah to California since the evidence was relevant to the
circumstances surrounding the crime and aided the state in
establishing that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the
owner of the vehicle.
In the instant case, the state argued that the testimony
of Jean Hickham was relevant to Mr. Johnson's intent in shooting
Trooper Bringhurst (T. 594). Jean Hickham testified that several
hours before the incident, she had talked to Mr. Johnson on the
telephone for approximately 30-45 minutes (T. 713). She stated that
Mr. Johnson was upset because his girlfriend was seeing another man,
Michael Polton (T. 714-6).

Hickham told the officer that

Mr. Johnson threatened to tear Polton's legs off, blow his head off,
blow up the apartment, and shoot any officer who got in his way
(T. 716, 720-1, 738). Hickham also testified that she heard a gun
clicking in the background (T. 717). 5
While the testimony of Jean Hickham, if believed,
suggests a propensity for violence on the part of Mr. Johnson, it
does not address the issue of whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot

b

Hickham testified that she exaggerated in giving her statements to
the police and that she was intoxicated on the night in question,
had difficulty remembering details, and had made up certain
statements she made to the police (T. 721, 723, 728, 730). She also
testified that she did not remember Danny threatening to shoot any
police officer who got in the way of his carrying out his threats
against the apartment or Polton (T. 730).
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Trooper Bringhurst.

The focus of the threats was Michael Polton and

Mr. Johnson's girlfriend; the threatened violence was directed
against the pair and the apartment in which they were located, not
at a highway patrol officer, several hours later and many miles
away.

The statement that Mr. Johnson would shoot any officer who

got in his way referred to an officer who might attempt to interfere
with the threatened violence at the apartment not an officer who
stopped him several hours later for driving under the influence.
Unlike the situation in Daniels where the siphoning of
the gas was integral to the defendant's story that he had little
money and had taken the car in order to get to California, the
conversation several hours prior to the incident had nothing to do
with the shooting of Officer Bringhurst, other than to suggest that
Mr. Johnson had a character for violence and acted in conformity
therewith in shooting the trooper.

Jean Hickham's belief that she

heard a gun clicking in the background is similarly irrelevant to
the issue of whether Mr. Johnson intended to shoot Trooper
Bringhurst since there was no issue in this case as to whether Mr.
Johnson had a gun.

Because it was not relevant to any issue in this

case, the trial court erred in admitting Jean Hickham's testimony.
B.

THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL
THAN PROBATIVE AND WORKED MORE TOWARD IMPEACHING
MR. JOHNSON'S CHARACTER RATHER THAN ASSISTING
THE TRIER OF FACT.

Evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
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Rule 403,

Although relevant, evidence may be exlucded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp. 1984).
Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest a
decision on a improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.

Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Federal

Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102.
In United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d Cir.
1976), the Court stated that in applying a balancing test in
determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, a court must
consider the government's actual need for that evidence since proof
of a prior offense has a high potential for arousing the jury
against the accused creating a significant risk of undue prejudice
for the accused.

As this Court noted in Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at

1290, prior incidents are often not relevant to an issue at trial
and will conjur up speculation and prejudice with the jury.
In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) this
Court stated that admitting evidence of prior crimes tends to lead a
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather
than because the defendant has been found guilty of the offenses
charged (Citing State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah 1982)).
Saunders also noted that evidence of prior crimes is presumed
prejudicial and absent a reason to admit the evidence is to be
excluded.

Id.
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Two dangers inherent in admitting evidence of specific
acts of misconduct are (1) a jury may determine that the defendant
is a "bad man" and convict on lesser evidence than would ordinarily
be required; and (2) if such evidence is allowed a defendant faces
the possibility of having to defend an entire lifetime of incidents
in a single trial.

Starks, 581 P.2d at 1017 citing State v.

Johnson, 383 P.2d 862 (Ariz. 1963).
In Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283
(3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held that in the interest of
protecting a defendant's presumption of innocence, prior acts should
not be allowed to reach the jury.

The court's rationale was that a

defendant's previous brushes with the law are irrelevant to his
guilt or innocence of the crime with which he is charged and a
defendant must not be convicted based on guilt by reputation.

As

the court noted, when such evidence reaches the jury, it is
difficult if not impossible to assume the continued integrity of the
presumption of innocence.
glass of milk."

"A drop of ink cannot be removed from a

Id.

In the instant case, the testimony of Jean Hickham
pointed out prior bad acts by Mr. Johnson.

In addition to the

inherent prejudice that evidence of such misconduct creates, the
specifics of Ms. Hickham's testimony tends to mislead and confuse
the jury.

As previously outlined, the focus of the conversation was

on Polton and Mr. Johnson's girlfriend and the apartment in which
they were located.

The aside allegedly made by Mr. Johnson that he

would shoot any officer that attempted to interfere is confusing in
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this instance where an officer was actually shot.

While there is no

evidence that at the time of the Bringhurst shooting, Mr. Johnson
was attempting to carry out his threats made several hours earlier
or that Trooper Bringhurst was interfering with such an attempt to
carry out threats, the jury could have easily misinterpreted the
statement and focused on it in deciding that Mr. Johnson intended to
shoot Trooper Bringhurst.
The prejudicial effect of Jean Hickham's testimony
regarding unproven prior bad acts of Mr. Johnson, coupled with the
confusion of the issues as a result of such testimony substantially
outweighed any minimal probative value of the testimony, and the
trial court abused its discretion in permitting such testimony.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKHAM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The standard for determining whether the error in
admitting the Hickham testimony requires reversal is whether the
outcome would likely have been different had the testimony not been
admitted.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).
This Court has recognized the prejudicial effect of

admitting prior convictions on numerous occasions.

See State v.

Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 47 (1988) (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
Unproven allegations of prior criminal acts are as prejudicial, if
not more so, since they are presented to the jury without
establishing that they in fact occurred, thereby disturbing the
defendant's presumption of innocence.

- 43

-

In the present case, Mr. Johnson testified that he did
not intend to shoot Trooper Bringhurst and that the Trooper reacted
when he saw the gun in Mr. Johnson's car and began firing at Mr.
Johnson (T. 579, 580). The trooper had difficulty remembering
details surrounding the shooting, but claimed that the shooting
began with a "boom" and bright lights, suggesting that Mr. Johnson
fired the shotgun first.6

The jury had to decide whether to believe

the imprecise testimony of Trooper Bringhurst which was contradicted
by the testimony of Officer Evans and the physical evidence (See
discussion supra at 9-18) or the testimony of Mr. Johnson.

Under

such circumstances, evidence which painted Mr. Johnson as a violent
person and confusing testimony regarding an alleged threat to shoot
a police officer, prejudiced the jury's view of Mr. Johnson and made
it almost certain that the jury would disbelieve Mr. Johnson's
testimony.

The highly prejudicial nature of Hickham's testimony

affected the outcome of this case, requiring reversal and a new
trial.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN
IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER OFFICER OLSEN
TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS GUARDING MR. JOHNSON
TO STOP ANY ESCAPE ATTEMPTS.
During the direct examination of police Officer Vernon
Olsen the following colloquy took place:

6 Defense counsel established that the trooper had difficulty
remembering the details of the incident through the testimonies of
Tom Walsh, a reporter, and Lt. Fallows. See discussion, infra at
53-58.
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Q. (prosecutor) Are you familiar with the defendant,
Danny Lee Johnson?
A.

(Officer Olsen)

Yes, I am.

Q.

And how did you come to know him?

A.

I spent guard duty one day up at the hospital on him.
. . .

Q.

And what is hospital guard duty?

A.

Basically you're there to stop any escape attempts.

T. 387-8).
Counsel for Mr. Johnson made an immediate objection
(T. 387) and later moved for a mistrial (T. 455-6).

The trial court

erroneously denied the motion (T. 458).
The prosecutor impermissibly elicited the comment that
Mr. Johnson was an "escape risk" and thereby prejudiced the jury
against Mr. Johnson.

Labeling Mr. Johnson an escape risk connotes

violence and dangerousness, thereby permitting the jury to utilize
that characterization to assume he committed the violent and
dangerous acts of which he was charged.

Current case law and the

Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit the admissibility of such
prejudicial evidence, therefore the trial court committed reversible
error by denying the motion for a mistrial.
In a line of cases culminating in State v. Saunders, 699
P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to show criminal
disposition.

This Court has explained that such evidence is

"presumed prejudicial and that absent a reason for admission other
than to show criminal disposition, is excluded."
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Id. at 741. While

the characterization of an individual as an "escape risk" is not
evidence of prior crimes, it suggests that the individual is likely
to commit such a crime, and shares the same problems and concerns as
evidence of prior convictions.
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 112-13 (Utah 1986), this
Court stated,
[T]he term "prejudicial" should be construed to mean
inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the
conviction against the defendant for purposes other
than determining the defendant's credibility, and
therefore would tend to induce the jury to render a
verdict outside the relevant substantive evidence
bearing on the material elements of the crime.
The dangerousness and violence implicit in "escape risk" similarly
prejudices the jury against the accused because that
characterization affects the jury, inducing the jurors to consider
factors outside the relevant evidence of the crimes charged.
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) would
preclude the prosecutor from eliciting evidence that an individual
is an escape risk, since such evidence cannot be utilized to show
that the accused acted in conformity with a particular character
trait in committing the instant offense.

Since Saunders and Slowe

point out that the concern in allowing such evidence is that the
jury will transfer the danger and violence implicit in a
characterization of an individual as an escape risk to the violence
and dangerousness of the shooting Mr. Johnson was charged with, it
was improper and impermissible for the prosecutor to explicitly
request such evidence from a witness.

The solicited evidence had no

other evidentiary purpose and functioned only to predispose the jury
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to a finding of guilt on the current crimes charged because of Mr.
Johnson's presumed violent and dangerous character.
The presentation of the "escape risk" statement in the
instant case is analogous to those cases where the jury is
inadvertently allowed to view the accused in handcuffs, shackles, or
jail clothes.

See generally Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501

(1976); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (Cal. 1976).
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), this Court
established a two-prong consideration for determining the
appropriate remedy:

(a) whether the jury was allowed to consider

matters it was otherwise not justified in considering; and (b)
whether the jury was likely influenced by that information.

Id. at

426.
As outlined above, the first prong of the Valdez test was
met in the instant case since the prosecutor improperly introduced
the characterization of Mr. Johnson as an escape risk; the jury was
not otherwise entitled to hear such information.
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), this Court
reaffirmed Valdez and clarified that in considering the second
prong, whether the jury was influenced by the information, it is
appropriate to consider the evidence of the defendant's guilt.

This

Court acknowledged that where evidence of guilt is weak, the jury is
more likely to be influenced by a piece of the information than
where the evidence is strong.
As set forth in Point I, supra at 8-20, evidence of Mr.
Johnson's intent to commit an attempted homicide was not strong in
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the instant case.

The evidence was susceptible to varying

interpretations as to Mr. Johnson's intent, and the inadmissible
introduction of Mr. Johnson's alleged escape risk status could have
sufficiently tipped the balance for the jury in favor of finding him
to be violent and dangerous and therefore guilty of the crimes
charged.
As the comment of Officer Olsen was not admissible and
should not have been allowed to reach the jury, the trial court
erred in failing to deny the motion for a mistrial.

Accordingly,

this Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
LIEUTENANT DAN FALLOWS A HOSTILE WITNESS
OR WITNESS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ADVERSE PARTY
Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)7
provides:
Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary
to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading
questions should be permitted on cross examination.
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse
party, or a witness identified with an adverse
party, interrogation maybe by leading questions.
Rule 611(c) replaced the former Rule 43(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided in pertinent part:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions.

7

The language of Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules is identical to
that of U.R.E. 611(c) (1983) except that the federal rule is gender
neutral.
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Rule 611(c) was intended to enlarge the class of
witnesses considered hostile.

Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Ingles &

Associates, 653 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1982); Ellis v. City of Chicago,
667 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1981).
Under the old rule 43(b), a party calling a witness was
required to make a showing of bias or hostility.8

Fajeriak v.

State, 439 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1968); Haney v. Mizzell Memorial
Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984).

However, ff[r]ule 611(c) .

. . significantly enlarged the class of witnesses presumed hostile,
'and therefore subject to interrogation by leading questions without
further showing of actual hostility.1"

Haney at 1477-8.

In the present case, defense counsel called Lt. Fallows,
an employee of the Utah Highway Patrol, to testify regarding
statements Trooper Bringhurst made to Lt. Fallows about Bringhurst's
actions immediately prior to the shooting (T. 499-517).

Prior to

calling Lt. Fallows to the stand, defense counsel requested that she
be permitted to proceed through the use of leading questions
pursuant to Rule 611(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) so as
to avoid eliciting irrelevant information.

Defense counsel argued

that Lt. Fallows was a hostile witness or a witness identified with

8

In United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (1972), the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "where the defense calls a government
agent or person closely identified with the government, it should be
permitted to lead such a witness unless the government establishes
that the witness is not hostile or biased against the defense."
Bryant at 919. Hence, under the more restrictive rule 43, where the
witness is a government agent, as in the present case, the Sixth
Circuit shifted the burden to the state to establish lack of bias
before denying use of leading questions.
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an adverse party (Trooper Bringhurst and the State) and therefore
leading questions were appropriate.
The State, while arguing that leading questions should
not be permitted, essentially agreed with defense counsel's position
that the witness was not aligned with the defense, stating that
Lt. Fallows was a reluctant or uncooperative witness for the defense
(R. 487-8).

Although it was readily apparent that Lt. Fallows was

identified with the State and Trooper Bringhurst, the Court stated:
He may be identified with the adverse party but he
may still be a neutral witness if he's under oath to
answer truthfully all the questions that are asked.
T. 490.
Lt. Fallows was employed by the Highway Patrol, the same
agency which employed Trooper Bringhurst (T. 491-2).

He was a

personal friend of Trooper Bringhurst and had known him thirteen to
fourteen years (T. 492). Lt. Fallows acknowledged that he was
reluctant to testify for the defense, that he was concerned about
any appearance that he was aiding the defense, that he had strong
feelings about the outcome of the case, and believed that the proper
outcome was that Mr. Johnson be convicted (T. 492-3).

Lt. Fallows

refused to talk to defense counsel without the prosecuting attorneys
being present, and conferred with the prosecutors alone prior to
talking to defense counsel (T. 493-495).

Nevertheless, the trial

court required defense counsel to proceed using direct questions.
(T. 498)

(See Addendum A for complete transcript of testimony and

argument regarding defense counsel's request to question Lt. Fallows
through use of leading questions).
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In Ellis, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the trial court erred in disallowing the plaintiffs to use leading
questions when examining two police officers who were employees of
the defendant city and had worked closely with the individual
defendant.

The Court stated "[the officers] thus clearly qualified

as 'witness[es] identified with an adverse party' for purposes of
Rule 611(c)" [of the Federal Rules of Evidence]

Ellis at 613.

Even under the more restrictive Rule 43(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, leading questions were permissible where a
criminal defendant called a witness associated with the government
or prosecution.
(1972).

See United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912-17

The rationale for allowing leading questions in such an

instance is that an adverse witness will not be amenable to the
suggestibility of counsel's leading questions, and "is not likely to
be tractable on direct examination"

Bryant at 919.

In denying defense counsel's request, the trial court
abused its discretion.

The responses of Lt. Fallows indicated that

he was an employee of the State and so aligned with Trooper
Bringhurst and the State that he had the prosecutors advise him
prior to meeting with defense counsel and had strong feelings about
the outcome.9

The statements of the trial judge indicate he

misunderstood the requirements of Rule 611(c) and the issue raised
by defense counsel that during the examination of Fallows she would
be able to more directly elicit pertinent information if allowed to

9 Lt. Fallow's alignment with the State is further exemplified
by the state's attempt to use him as a rebuttal witness
(T. 741).
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lead.

The trial judge initially ruled that "we're going to

have to deny your motion to declare him as a hostile
witness. . . ."

(T. 497). After defense counsel asked the

trial judge to directly rule on whether Fallows was associated
with an adverse partyf the trial judge stated in part:
[I]f he's under oath that he will testify truthfully
regardless of the outcome, I think the Court is of
the opinion that until we find out that he's hostile
that even under 611(c) where it says he may be
associated with the opposing party, that under the
circumstances of this case here, that that motion
should be denied.
(T. 497).
The trial court continued to require a showing by defense
counsel that Lt. Fallows was actually "hostile" even though the
current Rule 611(c) is not so restrictive.

The fact that a witness

is under oath and agrees to answer truthfully is irrelevant to a
determination as to whether counsel should be permitted to lead.
All witnesses take an oath to tell the truth; leading questions are
used to focus on a specific area of testimony, to elicit information
which is damaging to the opposition and to avoid eliciting
irrelevant information.

An officer and friend of a fellow

officer-victim is not likely to offer damaging testimony unless
pinned down; for that reason, leading questions should be permitted
in an instance such as this.

The trial court erred in believing

open hostility or animosity is required under the rule.

The bias

of Lt. Fallows was apparent from his testimony; the state conceded
that he was a reluctant and uncooperative witness.

Under such

circumstances, the trial court erred in denying counsel's request to
proceed with leading questions.
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POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF OFFICER BRINGHURST'S
REPUTATION FOR TRUTHFULNESS.
In rebuttal, the state called two Highway Patrol officers
to testify that in the opinion of each, Trooper Bringhurst had a
reputation for being an honest person (T. 765, 768). Prior to such
testimony, defense counsel objected to the officers being allowed to
testify as to Bringhurst's character for truthfulness, arguing that
Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) did not permit such
character evidence unless the witness1 credibility had been attacked
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise (T. 761-763).

The

state argued that the prior inconsistent statements which the
defense brought up through cross-examination and subsequently
introduced through the testimony of Lt. Fallows and reporter Tom
Walsh amounted to an attack on Bringhurst's credibility, thereby
permitting the use of positive character evidence (T. 760-2).

The

trial court overruled defense counsel's objections, and allowed the
two officers to testify as to Bringhurst's reputation for honesty
(T. 763-4) .
Rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1)
the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise.
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While this Court has not decided whether evidence of
prior inconsistent statements constitutes an attack on credibility
so as to allow positive character evidence, other courts have held
that it does not.

In Commonwealth v. Sheline, 461 N.E.2d 1197

(Mass. 1984), the defendant attempted to introduce evidence of his
character for truthfulness after the state introduced evidence of
prior inconsistent statements made by him.

In affirming the trial

court's refusal to allow the use of character evidence under such
circumstances, the Sheline court held that the defendant's character
for truthfulness was not attacked by the use of prior inconsistent
statements and pointed out that while prior inconsistent statements
suggest that a witness' testimony should not be believed, the reason
for such disbelief "may be found in forcefulness on the part of the
witness, or in his having been deceived, or in any other possible
cause."

Id.

at 1204. The Court further noted that "the disbelief

sought to be produced is perfectly consistent with an admission of
his general good character".

Id.

in Ellis v. Ellis, 612 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981),
the court stated:

"Furthermore, a witness or party who has been

impeached by the use of a prior inconsistent statement may not seek
to be rehabilitated through the introduction of evidence of his good
reputation for truth and veracity."

Id. at 748.

In State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 937 (Me. 1980), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine pointed out that cross-examination
which establishes inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a defendant's
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testimony did not amount to an attack on credibility and use of
character evidence to rehabilitate the defendant was therefore
impermissible.
In the instant case, defense counsel questioned Trooper
Bringhurst regarding several inconsistencies between his testimony
at trial and statements he had previously made to Det. Johnson,
Lt. Fallows and reporter Tom Walsh.

The defense subsequently called

Lt. Fallows and Mr. Walsh to testify to the prior inconsistent
statements made by Trooper Bringhurst.
In testifying at trial, Trooper Bringhurst exhibited
confusion as to whether he was holding his flashlight in his left or
right hand as he approached Danny Lee Johnson's car and whether he
flashed the light in the car's mirror (T. 80, 82, 87, 108,
136-137).

Lt. Fallows testified that two days after the incident,

Trooper Bringhurst told him:
"I think it was in my right hand at this time.
Probably changed over when I closed the car door.
Walked up like this and hit him in the face right
there and didn't have it. As a matter of fact, the
street was so light and everything, I didn't even
have my flashlight in his car."
Lt. Fallows further testified that his impression was that Trooper
Bringhurst believed he had the flashlight with him, but was confused
as to which hand it was in (T. 514). The testimony of Lt. Fallows
in regard to Bringhurst's prior statements about the flashlight was
not inconsistent with that of Trooper Bringhurst and exemplified the
Trooper's inability to recall that detail of the incident; such
testimony did not attack the credibility of Bringhurst within the
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meaning of Rule 608(a) and therefore should not trigger the use of
character evidence under that rule.
Trooper Bringhurst testified that when he approached the
subject vehicle, he stopped approximately 5 to 6 feet away (T. 82).
lit. Fallows testified that Bringhurst told him he stopped
approximately eighteen inches away (T. 516). This inconsistency
points to an inability to remember details, especially when taken in
context of the testimony of Lt. Fallows, elicited by the state on
cross examination, that Bringhurst was in pain and on medication
during the interview with Fallows and that Fallows had misgivings
about the timing of the interview so soon after the incident
(T. 169, 517, 526).
Trooper Bringhurst further testified that after asking
Mr. Johnson "Did you say you have been driving11 (T. 83), Johnson
responded "It doesn't make any difference, does it? (T. 83).
Fallows acknowledged that at one point during the interview,
Bringhurst said he could not remember what Danny Lee Johnson said
when the Trooper asked his question on approach to the vehicle, but
that once before that statement and four times following it,
Bringhurst repeated Johnson's response as "It doesn't make any
difference, does it" (T. 535). Again the testimony of Fallows
pointed out problems with recall, not questions as to the
credibility of Trooper Bringhurst.
Lt. Fallows testified to several other statements
Bringhurst had made to him which were either inconsistent with
Bringhurst's testimony at trial or further clarified that
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testimony.

Bringhurst told Fallows the car was going less than five

miles per hour before it stopped on Paxton Ave.; at trial Bringhurst
testified that the car was travelling at ten to twenty miles per
hour (T. 121, 507-8).

Bringhurst could not recall saying that he

was cocky as he approached the car; Fallows testified that
Bringhurst had told him he felt cocky (T. 134-5, 512).
Similarly, the prior inconsistent statement testified to
by a news reporter did not attack Trooper Bringhurst's credibility.
Trooper Bringhurst testified that he believed he was going to be
killed; however, in a statement to the reporter, the trooper said,
"it did not enter into my mind I was going to be killed" (T. 90,
148, 546) .
The inconsistent statements testified to by Lt. Fallows
and the news reporter pointed out Bringhurst's inability to recall
details about the incident.

As defense counsel argued, pointing out

such inability to recall does not amount to an attack on credibility.
As the Court stated in Commonwealth v. Clark, 502 N.E.2d
564, 569 (Mass. App. 1987), "It is the jury's function, not ours, to
determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The testimony of a
person associated with the court system that the complainant was a
'very trustworthy person' could have the effect of enhancing the
complainant's credibility."

The court in Clark held that it was

prejudicial error to allow evidence of character for truthfulness
when the complainant's testimony had been questioned by prior
inconsistent statements.
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The purpose of Rule 608 is to prevent trials from turning
into "swearing contests" with each side bolstering his or her
witnesses with other witnesses.

Thus a party is only allowed to

bring in evidence of a witness1 character for truthfulness after
that witness' character has been attacked.

"The mere fact that a

witness is contradicted by other evidence in a case does not
constitute an attack upon his reputation for truth and veracity."
United States v. Danehyy 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted).
In the instant case defense counsel never attacked
Officer Bringhurst's reputation for truthfulness.

Thus it was error

to allow evidence of Officer Bringhurst's reputation for
truthfulness.

This error created a likelihood of injustice and was

prejudicial because much of the case centered around whether the
jury believed Mr. Johnson's version of what happened the night of
the incident or Officer Bringhurst's version.

By allowing the

character evidence, the trial court improperly bolstered Officer
Bringhurst's credibility and thereby committed prejudicial error.
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER JURORS BEGAN
DELIBERATIONS DURING TRIAL.
A.

THE EARLY DELIBERATION VIOLATED MR. JOHNSON'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
right to due process is the right to a fair trial.
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implicit in the

In addition to the fourteenth amendment, due process
guarantee, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury.

Where jurors

begin deliberations prior to the end of the trial, both the sixth
amendment impartial jury guarantee and the fourteenth amendment due
process guarantee are violated.

See State v. Washington, 438 A.2d

1144 (Conn. 1979) .
In State v. Washington, the Connecticut Supreme Court
found a due process violation as well as a violation of the right to
an impartial jury where the trial court had instructed the jurors
that they could discuss the evidence among themselves before
submission of the case. The Washington Court acknowledged that it
is improper for jurors to discuss a case before final instructions
have been given, and the case has been submitted to them for
deliberation and pointed out the pitfalls of premature deliberations
stating that:
It is human nature that an individual, having
expressed in discussion his or her view of the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, would be inclined
thereafter to give special attention to testimony
strengthening or confirming the views already
expressed to fellow jurors [citations omitted].
Id. at 114.
The Washington court reiterated that the "pride of
opinion and consistency belongs to human nature." j^d. at 1148
quoting Winebrenner v. United States, 147 P.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir)
cert denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945).

Because the state did not show

that the constitutional deprivation was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Washington court reversed the conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial.

In State v, McGuire, 253 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. 1979), the
South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out that a jury should not
begin discussing a case until after the case is submitted to it and
acknowledged pitfalls similar to those acknowledged by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Washington.
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), this Court
held that the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury
under both the Utah and United States Constitutions was violated
where a juror engaged in conversation with a state witness. This
Court acknowledged that in such an instance, a juror may be
prejudiced even though such prejudice is not provable and the juror
himself does not recognize it.

Id. at 280.

In the present case, the trial court permitted the
following exchange to occur in the midst of defense counsel's
questioning of Trooper Bringhurst:
Q.

Do you recall testifying at the preliminary hearing

that you saw what you believed to be a shotgun?
A.

It was.

Q.

The question was do you recall making the statement

that you saw what you believed to be a shotgun.
A.

I don't recall making that statement.

THE COURT:

Just one minute.

JUROR #6:

I have a question.

We were told what was said

in here today is what we're supposed to go by totally; is
that right?
THE COURT:
JUROR #6:

Just the evidence.
Anything presented today.
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THE COURT:

Any time during the course of a trial the

only thing you're to consider is the testimony from the
witness who is talking or any of the evidence that is
introduced into court.
JUROR #6: Okay,

I'm just wondering.

cannot remember things that happened

I know myself, I
—

T. 153.
This exchange indicates that early in the trial Juror #6
was committing himself to the position that Bringhurst's inability
to remember details was inconsequential and thereby aligning himself
with the state.
Although the trial court in the present case did not give
an explicit instruction allowing for early deliberation as the trial
court had done in Washington, the trial judge nevertheless committed
a similar error in permitting the deliberation to occur in open
court, in front of the other jurors.

The statements by Juror #6

amounted to deliberation since to "deliberate" means

ff

[t]o weigh,

ponder, discuss, regard upon, consider" (Washington at 1148 quoting
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.)).
The concerns set forth in Washington that a juror who
commits himself to a position will thereafter focus on evidence
supporting that position and be unlikely to change positions are as
prevalent in this case where the juror actually expressed his
opinion not only to other jurors but to all of the courtroom
personnel and the injured officer as they were in Washington where
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the

Court was concerned with the instruction and there was no

evidence that a juror actually deliberated prematurely.
While the facts of Pike are distinguishable from the
instant case, the concern in Pike that a juror might be tainted but
unable to recognize such taint is just as applicable to the instant
case.

The other jurors heard the remarks and responded in their own

minds, either agreeing or disagreeing and thereafter, may well have
begun focusing on evidence supportive of the state's position.
Based on the comments of Juror #6 early in the case, jurors may well
have ignored or discounted the numerous inconsistencies in Trooper
Bringhurst's testimony and the inability of Trooper Bringhurst to
remember details of the incident.

Although the jurors were not

questioned regarding the impact of the statements on them, even if
they had been questioned, they may well have been unable to
recognize the impact.

See Pike at 280.

The trial court could easily have avoided the impact of
these early deliberations by controlling the courtroom and not
allowing the juror to speak.

By allowing the comments, the trial

judge violated Mr. Johnson's right to due process and a fair trial
by an impartial jury, in violation of the sixth and fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
Not only did the trial judge allow Juror #6 to begin
deliberations in open court, he also allowed Juror #9 to ask a
question about the evidence.
doesn't know.

Juror #9 stated "maybe somebody

I don't know what a sawed off shotgun is.

barrel or the handle or both, or what?
sawed off shotgun" (R. 1497-8).

Is it the

You keep talking about a

The statement of Juror #9 also
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amounted to early deliberation, and the trial court erred in
allowing the juror to speak.

The statement pointed out to the state

that it needed to clarify what a sawed off shotgun is and otherwise
clarify the state's concern regarding the use of that gun.
Following the statements made by Jurors #6 and #9,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial (T. 157-8).

The Court denied

the motion (T. 158).
The early deliberations violated Mr. Johnson's right to a
fair trial by an impartial jury and amounted to reversible error
since the state can not establish that they were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
1987).

See State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah

As previously stated, the defense focused on the inaccurate

and inconsistent testimony of Trooper Bringhurst in attempting to
establish Mr. Johnson's version that Trooper Bringhurst shot first.
Where early in the trooper's testimony, a juror informs other jurors
that the ability to remember details does not matter, it cannot be
said that the impact on the remaining jurors and the defense's
ability to establish its case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

THE EARLY DELIBERATIONS VIOLATED MR. JOHNSON'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER
THE STATE CONSTITUTION.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees
an accused the right to trial by an impartial jury.

Article I, §7

of the Utah Constitution provides an accused the right to due
process of law.

In the event this Court determines that the federal

constitution does not prohibit the early deliberations which
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occurred in this case, it is nevertheless free to decide that the
premature deliberations violated the Utah Constitution.

See

generally State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring) and State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986).
This Court decided Pike on both state and federal
constitutional grounds. Hence, the concerns regarding tainting the
jury and establishing such taint are applicable under a state
analysis as well as a federal one.
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided in
Washington that the state constitutional guarantees of a right to
fair trial and impartial jury were violated in that case where the
judge instructed the jury that it could deliberate before submission
of the case.

Hence, even if this Court determines that the federal

constitution does not protect against the early juror deliberation,
the analysis set forth in A above is applicable to the state
provisions.
POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL WHEN IT
BECAME NECESSARY FOR HER TO TESTIFY.
An integral aspect of the defense in this case was
Mr. Johnson's testimony that he had obtained the two weapons in his
vehicle earlier in the evening for the purpose of showing them to
Detective Imig of the West Valley Police Department (T. 576).
Mr. Johnson testified that almost three years before, Detective Imig
had asked Mr. Johnson to acquire any illegal guns he came across for
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the officer (T. 576, 606). The purpose of this information was to
establish that Danny Lee Johnson did not know that the guns were
loaded, that he was not driving around looking for an armed
confrontation and did not intend to kill Trooper Bringhurst.
Defense counsel had spoken with Detective Imig on the
telephone on January 8, 1987 (T. 776). At that time, Detective Imig
did not inform defense counsel that he would be leaving the state
soon, and would be out of state for six weeks.

Id.

When defense counsel attempted to subpoena Detective Imig
for trial thirteen days after talking with him, an investigator with
the defense learned from the West Valley Police Department and a
return telephone call from the detective that Detective Imig was in
Southern California and he would not be returning to Utah for
several weeks (T. 700, 777). 1 0
Detective Imig returned to Utah as a rebuttal witness for
the State at State expense on the request of the State (without the

10 over defense objection that an investigator did not have the
necessary legal knowledge, the State was allowed to ask the
investigator: Do you know how to secure the attendance of an
out-of-state witness?
Investigator: I don't know all of the specifics but, you
know, I know somewhat.
Prosecutor: Did you undertake any of the steps in that
process?
Investigator: No ma'am. (T. 702).
The jury was left with the impression that the investigator failed
to take adequate steps to bring in a witness when, in reality, a
lawyer, not an investigator must take those steps. Furthermore, as
defense counsel argued to the judge, taking the steps to secure an
out of state witness are meaningless where the witness had indicated
an unwillingness to cooperate (T. 703).
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necessity of following the procedures for obtaining out of state
witnesses),

T. 697, 776.

The Detective testified on direct examination that he met
Danny Lee Johnson in 1982 and was on a first name basis with Danny
(T. 6769-70).

The detective talked with Danny on the phone at the

police department numerous times (T. 770). Imig testified that in
1984 Mr. Johnson had informed him that a man living at 7200 West
30th South in Magna had a sawed off shotgun in an attempt to arrange
something (T. 773).
Although the detective initially testified that he and
Danny had an ongoing exchange of information regarding illegal
weapons between 1983 and 1986 (T. 112),

he later testified that he

had not spoken with Danny since September or October, 1985 (T. 774)
and that in May 1985, his department had decided to discontinue its
working relationship with Mr. Johnson (T. 772).
On cross-examination, Detective Imig conceded that he had
not informed Danny of the department's decision to discontinue
working with him even though the Detective had spoken with Mr.
Johnson after that decision had been made (T. 779-80, 772). The
detective acknowledged that in a phone conversation with defense
counsel on January 8, 1987, he described an incident where Mr.
Johnson attempted to meet the Detective at the White Horse Lounge in
August or September, 1985, to discuss the purchase of illegal guns
(T. 778, 779). The detective denied telling defense counsel that
the only reason he and Mr. Johnson did not get together at the White
Horse Lounge was that they kept missing each other (T. 779). The
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detective testified to two separate incidents with Mr. Johnson
involving the purchase of a specific weapon at a specific place (T.
781).

He denied telling defense counsel that the only incident he

had been involved in with Danny regarding a gun was the 1985
incident at the White Horse Lounge (T. 781).
Following Detective Imig's testimony, defense counsel
moved to withdraw and for a mistrial, based on the necessity of her
testifying in rebuttal to Detective Imig's testimony (T. 785, 854).
Defense counsel pointed out that the detective denied making
statements to her, and that she needed to testify as to those
statements (T. 785). The trial court denied both motions (T. 787).
In State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), defense
counsel moved to withdraw prior to trial when it appeared that she
would be required to testify as to the prior statements a
co-defendant had made to her.

After the jury was sworn, defense

counsel moved for a mistrial in order to withdraw from the case.
The trial court in Leonard required defense counsel to continue her
representation of Mr. Leonard until she was forced to testify.
This Court reversed Mr. Leonard's conviction because of
the trial court's refusal to let defense counsel withdraw.

This

Court pointed out that where "counsel makes a timely and good faith
application to withdraw because of the need to preserve important
evidence . . ., a motion to withdraw should be granted."
654.

Leonard at

The Court focused on the negative impact on "the credibility

of a lawyer who appears as a witness as well as the effectiveness of
that individual as lawyer where she appears as both lawyer and
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witness in a given case and pointed out that under

ff

[t]he great

weight of authority . . . it is error for counsel to continue
representation where he or she is or ought to be a witness with
respect to issues that are not incidental or signficant11

Leonard at

653.
As this Court pointed out in Leonard, Disciplinary Rule
5-102(A) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah
State Bar required a lawyer to withdraw as counsel except under
specific numerated circumstances when it became apparent that the
lawyer might be required to testify on behalf of a client.

Leonard,

707 P.2d at 653. Defense counsel acted appropriately in the instant
case in moving to withdraw.
In the present case, the testimony defense counsel would
have given is important to the case, and not merely incidental or
insignificant.

The implication of Imig's testimony was that Mr.

Johnson was not involved in gun transactions with Imig and, at the
time of the incident involved in this case, was not gathering guns
for the detective.

Testimony from defense counsel would have shown

that they had been involved in gun transactions, that Imig was
interested or at least the impression given Danny was that Imig was
interested in weapons Mr. Johnson procured and that the arrangement
between the pair was somewhat casual. Defense counsel's testimony,
including the additional statement that Imig had told her that the
White Horse Lounge was the only incident between the pair, would
have suggested that Imig's recollection of details was faulty.
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The trial court's denial of defense counsel's motions to
withdraw for a mistrial denied Mr. Johnson due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment and compulsory process pursuant to the
sixth amendment of the federal constitution.

In Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 9120, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause and the sixth amendment compulsory process clause
were violated where state law precluded a defendant from using a
co-defendant as a witness on his behalf.

The Washington Court

acknowledged that a defendant's right to compulsory process included
the right not only to subpoena witnesses, but also to place on the
witness stand persons in the courtroom.

See also Webb v. Texas, 409

U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972).
In the instant case, defense counsel's testimony was
relevant and material; it would have supported Mr. Johnson's
testimony that, contrary to the testimony of Imig, the relationship
between the pair was casual and ongoing and that under such
circumstances, Mr. Johnson reasonably expected that Imig would be
interested in the guns.

Under such circumstances, the trial court

erred in denying the motion for mistrial.
POINT X.
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS WARRANTS
REVERSAL OF MR. JOHNSON'S CONVICTIONS
FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER.
In the instant case, the errors at trial which served to
buttress the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst and undermine the
testimony of Mr. Johnson had the cumulative effect of denying
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Mr. Johnson a fair trial.

The doctrine of "cumulative error" allows

for reversal where errors at trial, standing alone, do not require
reversal but the cumulative effect of such errors prejudices the
defendant and denies him a fair trial.
P.2d 240, 250 (Okl. Crim. App. 1980).

See Gooden v. State, 617
This Court has acknowledged

that "cumulative error" refers to a number of errors which prejudice
[a] defendant's right to a fair trial."

See State v. Ellis, 73 Utah

Adv. Rep. 12, 13-14 (December 12, 1987) quoting State v. Rammell,
721 P.2d 498, 501-2 (Utah 1986).
As previously outlined, the crux of the instant case
involved the testimonies of Trooper Bringhurst and Danny Lee
Johnson, the only individuals who directly witnessed the entire
incident.

Mr. Johnson's defense was based on his testimony that the

trooper fired the first shot, and Danny shot in response to that
initial shooting.

Trooper Bringhurst could not remember numerous

details, but testified that he heard a Boom followed by five Pops.
Under the circumstances of this case, the way in which
the jury perceived each witness was critical to its ultimate
determination.

Errors at trial had the cumulative effect of

inappropriately bolstering Trooper Bringhurst and undermining Mr.
Johnson, thereby denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial.
As outlined in Point VII, the trial court committed a
substantial error in allowing two officers to testify as to Trooper
Bringhurst's character for truthfulness.

The trial Court also erred

in admitting the bloody clothing of Trooper Bringhurst (See Point
III).

The early deliberations of the jurors suggested that at least
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one juror was sympathetic to the trooper and that the juror believed
the trooper's inability to remember details was unimportant (See
Point VIII).

The combined effect of these three errors was to

bolster the testimony of the trooper and create an atmostpher of
sympathy for him without focusing on his inability to remember
details.
The combined effect of several other errors served to
present Mr. Johnson to the jury as a bad and violent character who
had acted in conformity with that character during the incident in
question.

As outlined in Point II, the trial court erred in

admitting Mr. Johnson's prior misdemeanor theft convictions. The
trial court also erred in admitting the testimony of Jean Hickham,
which confused the issue and presented Mr. Johnson as a violent
man.

The erroneously admitted testimony of Vern Olsen that he was

guarding Mr. Johnson to prevent an escape was additional information
that the jury was allowed to consider which painted a picture of Mr.
Johnson as a dangerous and violent man.

Finally, defense counsel's

inability to testify regarding her conversation with Detective Imig
left Mr. Johnson unable to counter the implication in imig's
testimony that Mr. Johnson had not obtained the guns for Imig.
The cumulative effective of the errors committed by the
trial court had the effect of bolstering the trooper by
imappropriately emphasizing his character for truthfulness and the
unimportance of his inability to remember details while also
focusing on the gruesome details, thereby inflaming the jury. While
the cumulative effect bolstered the trooper, it served to diminish
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any positive feelings the jury had towards Mr. Johnson by
inappropriately pointing out that he had a prior criminal record,
had threatened violence in an unrelated incident and was otherwise a
violent man who was not to be believed.
Such bolstering of the trooper combined with the
diminishing of positive feelings towards Mr. Johnson resulted in an
unfair trial, requiring reversal.
POINT XI.
THE CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE CANNOT
" BE USED AS THE TRIGGERING OFFENSE FOR THE
HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE SINCE THE STATUTE
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES HOMICIDES.
The Utah Habitual Criminal statute explicitly excludes
first and second degree murders from being the "triggering" offense
in an habitual criminal charge.

Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as

amended) provides:
Habitual Criminal—Determination.—Any person who
has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses
having been at least a felony of the second degree
or a crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of the
first degree or felony of second degree, and was
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at
least a felony of the second degree committed in
this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years
to life.
Vermont is the only other state to statutorily exclude
murder as a triggering offense. Vermont Statutes Ann. (1974
Replacement Ed.) Title 13, Section 11 reads:
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§11• Habitual Criminals.
A person who, after having been three time
convicted within this state of felonies or attempts
to commit felonies, or under the law of any other
state, government of country, of crimes which, if
committed within this state, would be felonious,
commits a felony other than murder within this
state, may be sentenced upon conviction of such
fourth or subsequent offense to imprisonment for the
term of his nature life.—Amended 1971, No. 199
(Adj. Sess.), T. 15, eff. July 1, 1972.
Neither Vermont nor Utah has addressed the issue raised
in this case that an attempted first degree murder is explicitly
excluded as the triggering offense.

In other words, an "attempt" is

not separate or different from the substantive offense to which it
is attached and therefore an attempted murder offense as well as a
murder which is actually accomplished is excluded as a triggering
offense by the language of the habitual criminal statute.
Mr. Johnson was convicted of attempted first degree
murder, a first degree felony, on February 5, 1987 (T. 893). Also
"Attempt" is a classification which is attached to an underlying
offense.

In the instant case, the underlying offense to which the

attempt classification was attached was a first degree murder.

The

Utah Habitual Criminal statute specifically refers to offenses and
explicitly precludes first or second degree murder as triggering
offenses.

The "offense" for which Mr. Johnson was convicted was

first degree murder which was classified by the attempt
designation.

Because the offense itself involved a first degree

murder, the attempted murder conviction does not qualify as a
triggering offense for the Habitual Criminal charge.
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To allow Mr. Johnson's conviction to be enhanced as the
result of an attempted homicide conviction but not if an actual
homicide is committed is logically unsound.

Had the trooper died in

the present case, and Mr. Johnson as a result was convicted of
murder, the habitual criminal enhancement would have been
inapplicable.

Because the trooper survived, the state argued that

the habitual criminal enhancement is available.

Consequently, a

defendant who commits an attempted homicide can be subjected to
greater penalties than one who actually completes a homicide.
The eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause
prohibits disproportionate punishments.

See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.

277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645 (1983).

Giving Mr. Johnson

a more aggravated sentence for merely attempting rather than
completing the homicide is disproportionate and constitutionally
unsound.
Because "attempted" first degree murder cannot be the
triggering offense in an habitual criminal charge, the state failed
to prove the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the conviction should be reversed.
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DOCUMENTATION
OF MR. JOHNSON'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WHERE THE STATE
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PLEAS WERE KNOWING
AND VOLUNTARY.
The State of Utah offered as its Exhibit No. 2 on the
Habitual Criminal charge a document under seal from the State of
Idaho purporting to establish convictions for burglary, escape and
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escape and assault with a deadly weapon, all committed in the State
of Idaho (R. 633). The documents established on their face that Mr.
Johnson appeared with counsel, and entered a plea of guilty to each
of the charges, but did not establish that Mr. Johnson knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entered such pleas, waiving his right
to trial by jury, his right against self incrimination, and his
right to confrontation of his accusers and other attendant rights
(See Addendum B) .
Defense counsel relied on State v. Chervenell, 626 P.2d
530 (Wash. App. 1981) in arguing to the trial court that the state
was required to establish that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily
entered a guilty plea in order to use such plea as evidence in an
habitual criminal case (R. 644). The Chervenell court stated:
Once a defendant raises the issue, the State has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, in a prior conviction relied on by the
state to prove his habitual criminal status, was
apprised of the nature of the offense and the
consequences of pleading guilty to it [citations
omitted].
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), the United States Supreme Court reversed a
conviction where the trial court accepted a guilty plea without
first establishing that the defendant was knowingly and voluntarily
entering that plea.

The Boykin Court stated

,f

[admissibility of a

confession must be based on a reliable determination of the
voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the
defendant."

Id. at 242. The Boykin Court went on to point out that

a waiver of several constitutional rights, including the privilege
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against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right
to confront witnesses, are involved in entering a plea of guilty,
and that a waiver of such rights cannot be presumed from a silent
record,

id. at 243.
The Boykin Court reasoned that a guilty plea is more than

an admission of conduct, that it is itself a conviction (Id. at 242)
and that reversible error under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution occurs where
the record does not disclose that a defendant voluntarily and
understanding]^ entered the guilty plea.
In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19
L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), the United States Supreme Court reversed a
conviction where evidence of a prior conviction which showed that
the defendant had not been represented by counsel but did not show
on the record that the defendant had waived counsel, reached the
jury.

Id. at 112-13. The Burgett Court acknowledged that voluntary

waiver of counsel cannot be presumed from a silent record and
reasoned that a constitutionally infirm conviction prejudicially
affected the outcome of the case.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct.
1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), the defendant appeared with counsel and
entered a plea of guilty.

The United States Supreme Court reversed

the conviction based on that guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the judge failed to personally
inquire of the defendant whether he understood the charges and
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consequences of the plea.

Although McCarthy was based on the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the language suggests that a
defendant must be informed of the nature of the charges and
consequences of the plea for the plea to be valid.

The McCarthy

Court pointed out that if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due
process and is therefore void.

Id.

The Court added:
Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all
the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be
truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.
Id.
In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the
defendant challenged the admission of evidence of a prior conviction
in a habitual criminal proceeding on the grounds that he was not
shown to have voluntarily entered his guilty plea in the prior
proceedings.

In that case, this Court rejected the defendant's

argument because an affidavit signed by the defendant showed that
the defendant had been advised of the consequences of entering the
plea and the possible penalty for the conviction, the waiver of his
right to trial by jury, his right to confront the witnesses against
him, his privilege against self incrimination and his right to
appeal the conviction.

Id. at 743. The defendant also stated in

the affidavit that he had seen a copy of the information and
understood the charge.

This Court held that under such

circumstances, a presumption that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily entered his plea was raised and, since the defendant
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offered no evidence to rebut that presumption, the plea was entered
voluntarily and its admission into evidence on the habitual criminal
charge proper.
In the present case, no such affidavit was entered into
evidence by the state.

Mr. Johnson challenged the validity of the

prior pleas and the state failed to produce any evidence to sustain
its burden of proving that the pleas were voluntarily and knowingly
made.
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), this
Court reviewed "the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in all
trial courts in this state" and remanded the case to the trial court
to enable the defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas.

This Court acknowledged that the due process clause of the

federal constitution and Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure require that the trial judge take certain steps in
establishing that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and
cited the concurring opinion of Justice White in Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) stating:
[I]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty plea
to be entered against a defendant solely on the
consent of the defendant's agent—his lawyer. Our
cases make absolutely clear that the choice to plead
guilty must be the defendant's: it is he who must
be informed of the consequences of his plea and what
is that he waives when he pleads, Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969); and it is on his admission that
he is in fact guilty that his conviction will rest,
(citations omitted).
Gibbons 740 P.2d at 1313.
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Hence, the presence of counsel does not insure that a guilty plea is
taken in compliance with the due process clause of the federal
constitution.
In the event this Court finds no federal due process
violation in the use of such convictions, Mr. Johnson's state due
process rights, as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah
Constitution were nevertheless violated by the use of such
convictions.

While there is no Utah case on point, State v.

Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) indicates this Court's willingness
to apply state due process guarantees in situations where the law in
regard to the federal due process guarantee is not clear.

Requiring

that a prosecutor use prior convictions based on guilty pleas in an
habitual criminal proceeding only after establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that such convictions were knowingly and
voluntarily entered is firmly within due process guidelines.

See

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
The judgments admitted in this case as state's exhibit 1
were not valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §7 of the
Utah Constitution.

The state failed to show that Mr. Johnson had an

understanding or knowledge of the effect of entering a guilty plea
or that he knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights set forth in
Boykin v. Alabama.

The habitual criminal charge based upon the

constitutionally infirm pleas should be reversed.
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POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON MR. JOHNSONfS
CONVICTIONS FOR VEHICLE BURGLARY AND AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT TO PROVE THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE
The Utah Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah Code Annotated
76-8-1002, provides:
Habitual Criminal—Determination.—Any person who
has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed
for felony offenses at least one of which offenses
having been at least a felony of the second degree
or a crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of the
first degree or felony of second degree, and was
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at
least a felony of the second degree committed in
this state, other than murder in the first or second
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years
to life.
The statute on its face requires that in order to be
convicted of Being an Habitual Criminal based on convictions from
foreign jurisdictions, one of those convictions would have to have
been at least a second degree felony if committed in the State of
Utah.
In State v. Wait, 509 P.2d 372 (Wash Ct. App. 1973), the
Washington Court of Appeals held that ffa previous conviction under a
federal statute [may] be used for purposes of a state habitual
criminal act as long as elements sufficient to amount to a state
felony were included within the federal offense and thereby
necessarily were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." [citations
omitted].

Id. at 375.
In State v. Rinier, 609 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1980) the

Washington Supreme Court stated "the test for determining the
sufficiency of an out-of-state conviction is whether the indictment
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or information under which defendant was convicted in a foreign
jurisdiction stated facts sufficient to amount to the minimum
elements of a felony in Washington."

Id. at 1360.

In People v. Taylor, 317 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957),
reh'g denied, Nov. 27, 1957, hearing denied Dec. 30, 1957, the Court
overruled a conviction under the California habitual criminal
statute where the state did not offer any proof that two foreign
convictions it relied on met the minimum requirements of the crimes
listed in the California statute.

In that case, the defendant had

been convicted of a burglary in Oklahoma.

The Oklahoma statute

defined burglary as breaking and entering a dwelling house of
another with intent to commit any crime (Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, §1431
(1983)) whereas the California statute defined burglary as an entry
into a structure "with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony."

Pen. Code §459.

Id. at 169. The Taylor Court stated:

It may well be that defendant was prosecuted under
the statutes which permit a conviction of burglary
for breaking and entering with intent to commit some
misdemeanor other than petit theft, and we must
presume on appeal that he was convicted of the least
offense [citations omitted].
Id. at 169.
Under such circumstances, the state failed to prove that
the offense for which the defendant was convicted in Oklahoma were
equivalent to those enumerated in the California statute.

Id. at

169.
In the present case, the State offered three judgments of
conviction to support the Habitual Criminal charge.
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The first

judgment showed a conviction for burglary, the second showed a
conviction for escape and the third, a conviction for escape and
assault with a deadly weapon.
Mr. Johnson's conviction for burglary under the Idaho
Statute would not qualify as a felony in the State of Utah.

The

Idaho statute does not distinguish between burglary of a building
and vehicle burglary and makes a distinction as to the degree of the
burglary based only on whether it was committed during the daytime
or at night.

The Idaho Code provides:

Idaho Code 18-1401. Burglary defined.—Every person
who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement,
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable,
outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, closed
vehicle, closed trailer, airplane or railroad car,
with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is
guilty of burglary.
18-1402. Degrees of burglary.—Every burglary
committed in the night time is burglary of the first
degree, and every burglary committed in the day time
is burglary in the second degree.
18-1403. Punishment for burglary.—Burglary of the
first degree is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for not less than one (1) nor more than
fifteen (15) years. Burglary of the second degree
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for not more than five (5) years.
Utah, on the other, makes a distinction between a
burglary of a building and a burglary of a vehicle.

See Utah Code

Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended and Utah Code Ann, §76-6-204 (1953
as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended) provides in

pertinent part:
76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle—Charge of other
offense.—
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle
with intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of
a burglary of a vehicle.
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a Class A Misdemeanor.
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Hence the vehicle burglary would have been a Class A
Misdemeanor under the Utah statutes, and therefore not applicable to
an habitual criminal charge.

See State v. Tribble, 613 P.2d 173

(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) and People v. Taylor, 317 P.2d. 167.
The Idaho conviction for Assault with a deadly weapon
would not qualify as at least a second degree felony in the State of
Utah.

The Idaho Code provides:
18-905. Aggravated assault defined.—An aggravated
assault is an assault:
(a) With a deadly weapon or instrument without
intent to kill; or
(b) By any means or force likely to produce great
bodily harm. [; or]
(c) With any vitrio, corrosive acid, or a caustic
chemical of any kind.
(d) "Deadly weapon or instrument" as used in this
chapter is defined to include any firearm, though
unloaded or so defective that it cannot be fired.
18-906. Aggravated assault—Punishment.—An
aggravated assault is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison not to exceed five (5) years or by
fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) or
by both.

The Utah Code makes such an assault a third degree felony.
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 76-5-103 provides:
Aggravated assault.—A person commits aggravated
assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury
to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third
degree.
In addition, the punishment Mr. Johnson received on the
assault charge, zero to two years, is significantly less than the
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punishment for a second degree felony in the State of Utah.

Hence

the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was not a felony of
at least the second degree.
The remaining two charges of escape arose under
circumstances where, although Mr. Johnson was being held at the
Idaho prison or adjacent farm facility, he was being held on the
vehicle burglary charge which would have been a misdemeanor in
Utah.

Had the crime of vehicle burglary been committed in Utah, Mr.

Johnson would have been in custody at the jail, and any escape would
have been a Class B Misdeameanor.

See Utah Code Ann. §76-8-309

(1953 as amended).
The escapes can be considered second degree felonies only
if the Court focuses on the place of incarceration and not the
underlying crime which put Mr. Johnson there.

Focusing on the place

of incarceration ignores the fact that Mr. Johnson was being held on
vehicle burglary charge, a relatively minor crime under Utah's
Criminal Code.

Allowing the escapes, which would have amounted to a

felony under Utah's criminal structure only if the place of
incarceration is the focus, to be used as second degree felonies to
support the habitual criminal charge does not further the purpose of
the Habitual Criminal statute, which is to make persistent serious
offenders subject to greater sanctions.
P.2d 187, 190
1985).

See State v. Montague, 671

(Utah 1983); State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah

Denoting the escapes as second degree felonies does not

negate the fact that Mr. Johnson had a prior conviction for only one
"street" crime which would have been a misdemeanor if committed in
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Utah.

Mr. Johnson's prior record does not show the type of

persistent offender the legislature intended to be punished by the
habitual criminal statute and upholding the habitual criminal
conviction based on Mr. Johnson's prior record does not further the
purposes of the statute.
Because the trial court erred in relying on the prior
convictions involved in this case, the conviction for Habitual
Criminal should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Danny
Lee Johnson, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
convictions and remand the case to the district court for either
dismissal of the charges or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

If

day of JJay, 1988.

YuSy),\.P^—
FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Appellant

LISA J. J^EMAL
Attorney for Appellant

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

1

bias or a feeling or an interest in the case that is so

2

overwhelming that it's up to the Court to make the

3

determination that because of that association that we

4

ought to lead, and I am asking the Court to do that.

5

THE COURT: Well, instead of going on any furthejf-

6

why don't we have him take the stand.

7

some questions. We can determine whether he's going to

8

be biased, and if he is, we can declare him to be a hostile

9

witness.

10
11

You can ask him

If he's going to be neutral, then he can be —
MS. PALACIOS:

Okay.

I will put him on the

stand.
THE

12
13

BAILIFF:

THE COURT:

Do you want him right now?
Right now.

14
15

DAN L. FALLOWS,

1€

called as a witness by the defendant, having been duly

17

sworn, was examined and testified upon his oath as follows:

18
19
20
21

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. PALACIOS:
ft

Lt. Fallows, before the jury enters the room,

22

I am going to ask you some preliminary questions. Would

23

you please first state your name.

24
25

Aft

Dan L. Fallows.
And Lt. Fallows, who are you employed by?
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1
2
3
4

A.

of the Utah Highway Patrol.
ft

Is that the same agency that employees

Trooper Bringhurst?
k

5
6

The Utah Department of Public Safety Division

ft

7

That's correct.
And how do you know Trooper Bringhurst?

A.

I have known him through working acquaintance

8

and developed friendship through the 13, 14 years he has

9

been on.

to

ft

Would you say that he's a personal friend?
k

11
12
13

ft

16

A.
ft

19

That's correct.
Is it true that you did not want any appearance

of associating with the defense?

17
18

Is it true or not true that you were upset

at having to testify on behalf of the defense?

14
15

Yes.

A.

I wouldn't say that that is a correct statement.

I honor the subpoena.
ft

I understand that.

But your feelings were

20

that you did not want to be, if I may use your word,

21

connotated with the defense; is that correct?

22
23

A.
ft

A true reluctance, yes.
And is it or is it not true that you were

24

concerned regarding your appearance as to other law

25

enforcement people that you would be aiding the defense
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O

VJ*

*-.* —? w **-»

1

if you testified on behalf of the defendant?

2
3

A.
ft

5
6

But it's a concern nonetheless; is that correct?
k

4

That was a natural concern on my part.

ft

Correct.
And do you have strong feelings about this

case and the outcome of this case?

7

A.

I couldn't answer no to that*

It's a situation

8

where obviously I have feelings but I also have a duty

9

which I will perform.

10
11

ft

strong feelings about the outcome of this case?

12
13
14

A.
ft

And you would like to see the defendant convicted)

A.

\C

ft

17

convicted?

18

20

Yes.

is that correct?

15

19

I realize that, but my question is do you have

I would like to see justice served.
But you would also like to see the defendant

A.

I don't think that's a fair statement.

like to see justice served in this case.
ft

And in your opinion is justice that the defendant)

21

be convicted?

22

A.

23

I would

ft

Yes.
And is it not true that you would not talk

24

to us, meaning the defendant's attorneys, without or at

25

least you expressed that you did not want to talk to us
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without the county attorneys or even commissioner, I believe
is who you said, being present at the same time?
k

That's not entirely correct.

I have talked

to you and your secretary.
$

But I mean regarding the facts —

k

I simply expressed a desire that before I answer

your questions that I then seek counsel through the County
Attorney's Office and the advice was given by me when I
expressed my concerns to the commissioner of public safety,
who is an attorney, that he felt like that would be all
right.

I simply didn't want to violate any ethics or anythirjg

Q,

And in fact in response to our subpoena you

went to the commissioner and asked him what to do; is that
right?
A.

No.

No.

I only did that after I got a phone

call from you and from your secretary questioning an
appointment to meet and go over specific questions.
was —

That

I then notified the commissioner of public safety

through his secretary and expressed my concerns.
Q.

And at that point then you talked to us only

when the county attorney was present with respect to the
facts of this case?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And the county attorney talked to you before

we were ever present; is that correct, on the same day?
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1

k

Yes.

2

ft

Rnf

3

A.

umi

never met with us alone- -'~ that correct?
- .'-•'-

4
5

to h a v e hir: .ecidieci as a nostii*-1 w: m e s s

6

clear wh»-""

7

1 he conv

8

hat> an interest

•>

: *- J < - ^ c

,t'

he beli^v^ - ^ , r.-,.ce requires

f-b-if

=i someone who
- •.:. the adverse party*
-:-- ™

9
10

chink

„ ~ -

a 1"i "w -'[uest i "i HIS

your Honor?

11
CROSS-EXAMINATION

12
13

BY MS.

KNIGHT-EGAN;

ft

1

IIii i 1: i: lit 11; i s
A.

16

Fall ows, yo* nave taken an oatu LU L

Lt:

14

.

that:

correct?

Yes.

a
•

k

—

a
21

i ii iwu i

III

; b I.I

I! I

! II

U .

I i i f ] "" S

questions f a i n y aria honestly regardless of the feelings
^•ou have expressed abo-ut this case?
. •_

k

Yes. T wi "•

' , because 1" *.
« ij, q,i r c l 1 ii >;r

!

That s whete the reluctance comes

.-.:/** • truthfullv ar.: nonestly
n

quess

what causes the reluctance within myself that I have no
choice but to tell the truth.
Q.

And you're fully prepared to do that?

A.

Yes, I am.
MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:

Your Honor, I think we should

see how it goes and direct counsel to start out with
nonleading questions and if it becomes clear to the Court
that that, you know, the witness isn't responding fairly
to that form of questioning and that a more restrictive
form of questioning ought to be allowed, then at that time
the Court can direct that to happen.
MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, I would submit that

it can't be any clearer than a witness who is a personal
friend of the person who was severely injured here who
has an interest in the outcome.
that he not testify honestly.

I don't think it requires

I am not submitting at all

that he would not attempt to do that.

However, I think

the Court knows that when there's that type of interest,
there's a reason for those rules and we're asking the Court
to allow us to proceed by those rules.
THE COURT:

Based on his response, he has

indicated that he, if under oath, he will answer truthfully
regardless of what the outcome will be.

That unless it's

shown he's a hostile witness in his answers, that we're
going to have to deny your motion to declare him a hostile
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\J \J> \J J3 t

O

• ' witness before he's questioned a* *

~ '"*•

*

&s>.
respect ^

. i r u 1. ing

^Ouici

Iverse

.

part

i< t n-

vitness

" .*>-= •----

associated

^ u r t so

1 film?

tsing ca 1 o.«. * by you ,
T

~ he g o i n g z

^ callec

to

O \ r 7v r* ~ *

..*.

. .- a;i::et

r<; t h e S n a t e ,
^

. . . * „,.

j-uie -

too?

a:xd,. .e

there

*?

is al^

r,,~^,^~

:n

.

::^^Stio4

:*

a J L lows

*. :.ess
iSiu

.a.

«

WJ.

.

i . d d v e r s e part-

lourf's

, » . * . * >

- von
T

T"

naybe you can
>-

$ j nas m l . . .... ; ,
7

.

*

..— ,

*

I , I ni it

. i ^ e uuun^*^

^

I i i ni 1 1 i ,

t r : : . ,J \ J t a l k y u

o u t of y o u r r u l i n g now.
.. r - ^ " r

Honor,

*"*1 I ' ™ *-—*..: : i * do i s make a r e c o r d .
>L.
1

iddlHSo

22

KNIGHT-EGAN;

A I ..

>' "-

*>'

L l i e 11?

THE COURT;

23

C o u r t ' s ru ]. inq wou 111

24

witii t h e

25

that

respond.

K
,rt

respond to

She a l s - wanted - * <-^ v v---*

-r~
- ..

_atec|

iitate.
MS. PALACIO!S: • Undei.

w^vw.
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1

MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:

It says interrogation may

2

be by leading questions.

3

could find this witness is associated with a party and

4

still not find that the form of leading questions is

5

necessarily appropriate.

6

when we call a child witness, we're frequently allowed

7

to use leading questions but not until we run into trouble

8

on direct

9

the Court will permit us to adopt the other form.

10

Not that it has to be.

It's not automatic.

It's like

examination with the nonleading form.

THE COURT:

Yes.

The Court

Then

Pursuant to the language

11

that says "may," and pursuant to his answer that if he's

12

under oath that he will testify truthfullyregardless of

13

the outcome, I think the Court is of the opinion that until

14

we find out that he's hostile that even under 611(c) where

15

it says he may be associated with the opposing party, that

16

under the circumstances of this case here, that that motion

17

should be denied.

18

MS. PALACIOS:

19

THE BAILIFF:

20

THE COURT:

25

Just a minute.

Let's see if there's

anything else.

23
24

Should I bring the jury in, your

Honor?

21
22

Thank you, your Honor.

MS. PALACIOS:

I think we're prepared to proceed

with him.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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